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POINTS ABOUT CEDAR POINT: WHAT LABOR
ACCESS SURVIVES, AND WHAT SHOULD
SURVIVE (OR BE RESTORED)
MichaelJ. Hayes*
INTRODUCTION

On June 23, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a California
regulation, issued in 1975, that gave labor organizations a right to access
property of agricultural employers for up to three hours per day on 120
days per year was a per se "Taking" under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.1 The Court in this CedarPoint
Nursery decision also called the regulation "a formal entitlement to
physically invade the [employers'] land" and therefore "a simple
appropriation of private property." 2 Consequently, the Court found, the
regulation was at best a Taking without the compensation required by the
language of the Fifth Amendment. 3 The Court reversed the decision of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had ruled that the access
regulation was not a "per se physical taking" and therefore dismissed the
employer's takings claim. 4 The Supreme Court remanded the decision to
the Ninth Circuit to reconsider the case consistently with the Court's
decision. 5
Cedar Point Nursery's owner said of the decision that it "protects
everyone's freedom to decide for themselves who is-and is notallowed on their own property." 6 However, that statement constitutes
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. Former Director, Office of
Labor-Management Standards, U.S. Department of Labor (Aug. 2013-2016). J.D., University of
Virginia and B.S. Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor Relations. All views expressed
in this Article, and all errors, are the author's own.

1. See Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).
2. See id. at 2080.
3.

See id. passim.

4. See Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma, 923 F.3d 524 (9th Cir. 2019), rev'd sub nom. Cedar
Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).
5.
6.

CedarPoint Nursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2080.
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what has become known as "spin." The majority's opinion, as discussed
more fully below, discusses multiple situations in which governmentmandated or authorized access to private property still will not be treated
as a "per se taking," whether the property owner likes it or not.7
The Supreme Court's Cedar Point Nursery decision likely marks a
major change in the law on Takings. However, this article will not discuss
the decision's effects on Takings law except to the extent those are
relevant to access to private property for union organizing, representation
or protest. The case itself involved access of union organizers and agents,
the latest in a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions on access of, and
ability to exclude, such persons.8 Most of those decisions were discussed
in Cedar Point Nursery's majority and dissenting opinions, and oneBabcock & Wilcox-was also discussed, and emphasized in Justice
Kavanaugh's concurrence. 9 The petitioner as indicated by his postdecision statement, and others who submitted briefs were apparently
seeking a constitutional right to exclude, regardless of the "just
compensation" referenced in the Fifth Amendment. 10
This article will next discuss, in Part I, the U.S. Supreme Court
majority's decision in Cedar Point Nursery." Part II of the article
summarizes the current federal labor law on nonemployee access to
property, beginning with an examination of Justice Kavanaugh's
concurrence in Cedar PointNursery, then explaining the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1992 Lechmere decision that restricts property access of
nonemployee union organizers, and finally describing the current law on
exceptions to that restriction. 12 Part II of this article discuss what access

https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/daily-laborreport/XFS2RN9G000000?bna_news_ filter=daily-labor-report#jcite (quoting Mike Fahner, Cedar
Point Nursery owner and president).
7. See infra notes 9 through 77 & accompanying text.
8. See generally Cedar Point Nursery, 141 S. Ct. passim (discussing union organizers
representing workers at Cedar Point Nursery).

9.
10.

See id. at 2070.
See, e.g., Brief of the Amicus Curiae Liberty Justice Center in Support of Petitioners at 13,

Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021), (No. 20-107), 2021 WL 130105, at *2. ("when
state action is present, as it is here, that common-law right to exclude is a constitutional right to
prevent a taking."); Brief for Amicus Curiae Americans for Prosperity Foundation in Support of

Petitioners at 11-19, Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021), (No. 20-107) (contending
that California regulation providing access for organizers is not even for "public use" so that absolute
exclusion, not entry and compensation, is appropriate); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of American
Farm Bureau Federation in Support of Petitioners at 3-6, Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct.

2063 (2021), (No. 20-107) (similarly arguing access authorized by California regulation was not for
a "public use.").
11.
12.

See infra Part L.
See infra Part II.
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to private property for union-or labor rights-related purposes
employees have, or at least should have, without compensating the
property's owner after the U.S. Supreme Court's Cedar Points Nursery
decision. 13 Finally, Part IV of the Article first expounds on why the Fifth
Amendments Takings Clause is not now and should not in the future be
treated as the source of "property rights" in federal labor law, but then
analyzes how the Takings clause should be applied if federal courts (or
agencies) disagree and apply the Takings clause to federal labor law.14
That analysis determines that, following the text of the Takings clause,
unions should be able to "justly compensate" property owners for access
to property, rather than being absolutely excluded from it.15
I. SUMMARY OF THE CEDAR POINTS NURSERY SUPREME COURT
DECISION

The Court's majority, in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts,
began with a sentence summarizing the California Agricultural Labor
Relations Board regulation at issue as one that "grants labor organizations
a 'right to take access' to an agricultural employer's property in order to
solicit support for unionization."1 6 The Court added that under this
regulation a labor organization could take such access "for up to four 30day periods in one calendar year." 17 Within any single day of access, the
regulation authorized access by up to two organizers per work crew (and
for crews with forty-five or more workers, one additional organizer per
every fifteen workers over thirty in a crew) for "up to one hour before
work, one hour during the lunch break, and one hour after work." 18 The
regulation prohibited "disruptive conduct" by organizers, but expressly
permitted them to "meet and talk" with workers on employer property.19
This regulation, the Court announced at the beginning of Part II,
Subpart B of its decision, "appropriates a right to invade the growers'
property and therefore constitutes a per se physical taking." 20 The Court
said this after, in Part II, Subpart A, it discussed some of its past takings
decisions that had described legal rules for property as "regulatory
13. See infra Part III.
14.
15.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part IV.

16. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2066 (2021) (citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8,
§20900(e)(1)(C)).
17. Id. at 2069 (citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 20900(e)(1)(A), (B)).
18. Id. (citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 20900(e)(3)(A)-(B)).
19. See id.
20. See id. at 2072.
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takings" that went "too far," and recharacterized those as "physical
appropriation" cases. 2 1 After declaring that the "label" regulatory taking
"can mislead," the Court in Part II, Subparts A and B discussed many of
its past decisions as supporting its announced position on "physical
appropriation" and "physical invasion," with some of those past decisions
finding the taking imposed a "servitude" or impaired an "easement, "22 and
others that had found a taking based on application of the Penn Central
standard for regulatory takings. 23 The Court also based its ruling on its
2015 decision in Horne v. Department of Agriculture,24 in which the
Court found that the government's "physical appropriation" of raisins was
a "per se" taking, even though a regulation that would have had the same
economic impact probably would not have been found a taking. 25 Also
key to the Court's decision was its finding, based on many of its past
decisions identified above, that the "right to exclude" is a "fundamental"
and "essential" property right.2 6
In Part II, Subpart C, the Court majority explained its bases for
disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit and the dissent as to whether California
"union organizers' access" regulation was a per se physical taking. 27 In
response to the dissent's point that this could not be a per se taking
because it was not permanent or daily, the Court majority observed that in
past decisions it had found government occupations of property to be
takings even when "temporary." 28 The Court added, as will be discussed
more fully below, that the duration of a taking "bears only on the amount
of compensation." 29 The Court majority further claimed that takings
could be intermittent, based on the only intermittent overflights of
property at issue in the Supreme Court's 1946 decision in Causby.30 The
21. See id at 2071-72.
22. See id. at 2073 (discussing decisions in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979)
and then United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946)).
23. See id. at 2073-74 (discussing decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987) and then Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)). See
also id at 2072 (relying on Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, 535 U. S.
302 (2002), in which the Court had also applied the Penn Central standard, as also supporting its view
on per se physical appropriations of property).

24. Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2015).
25. See Cedar PointNursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2074 (citing Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2419).
26. See id at 2072-73 (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 179-80 (1979), then citing
three other past U.S. Supreme Court decisions).

27.
28.
29.
30.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

at 2074.
(quoting Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322).
(citing United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 26 (1958)).
at 2075 (citing United States v Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946) where the Court

had found a taking even though the overflights "occurred on only 4% of takeoffs and 7% of landings
at the nearby airport.").
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Court failed to mention that in Causby the Supreme Court had also based
its conclusion of a taking on the Court of Claims finding that these noisy
low-altitude overflights had diminished the value of the property. 3 1 The
Court majority further based its finding that intermittent access could be
a taking on pure speculation: it asserted that though the taking in Nollan
"happened to involve a legally continuous right of access" there could be
"no doubt" the Court would have found a taking "if the easement" at issue
was "for only 364 days per year" because that easement "was hardly
continuous as a practical matter." 32
The next defendant argument the Court majority rejected, again. an
argument with which the dissent had agreed, was that the access granted
by California could not be a taking unless it was a state law easement. 33
The Court majority's reasoning for rejecting this argument was important,
but also probably the most cryptic or at least complex reasoning in the
decision. The Court majority began by acknowledging, at least "[a]s a
general matter," that "it is true that the property rights protected by the
Takings Clause are creatures of state law." 34 Perhaps significantly, and
arguably making all that followed in the paragraph dicta, the Court stated,
"no one disputes that, without the access regulation, the growers would
have had the right under Californialaw to exclude union organizers from
their property. And no one disputes that the access regulation took that
right from them." 3 5 As these points were undisputed, the Court probably
need not have said any more to find a taking. 36
Nonetheless, the Court added that when this "right to exclude" was
taken from the growers by the access regulation, the California agency
could not avoid the finding of a taking just because it occurred "in a form
that is a slight mismatch from state easement law." 37 Under the
Constitution, property rights "cannot be so easily manipulated." 38 The

31. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 257, 262-63.
32. See Cedar Point Nursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2075 (discussing Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)).
33. See id. at 2075.
34. See id. at 2076 (first citing Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U. S. 156, 164 (1998); then
citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992)).
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. See id.
37. See id. (first quoting Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2430 (2015), this time for
the proposition that "property rights cannot be so easily manipulated"; then quoting webb's Fabulous

Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155, 164 (1980) using the language that "a State, by ipse
dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation" in a decision
where a Florida county had claimed that just the fact that the funds to purchase a pharmacy had been
deposited with the county court justified the county's keeping the interest earned on that deposit.).

38.

See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021
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Court then called its approach to this issue "intuitive," and declared "we
have recognized that the government can commit a physical taking ...
by simply "enter[ing] into physical possession of property without
authority of a court order." 39 In that situation, the Court stated, "the
government's intrusion does not vest it with a property interest recognized
by state law, such as a fee simple or a leasehold.... Yet we recognize a
physical taking all the same." 4 0 The Court then apparently equated a
disagreement with its holding as in effect requiring a "formal
condemnation" by the government to fmd a taking, which was not a
41
position taken by the defendant, the dissent, or anyone in the case.
The Court concluded its rejection of the "easement" argument by
maintaining that in its past decisions in Portsmouth, Causby, and Loretto
it had "never ... consider[ed] whether the physical invasion sat issue
vested the intruders with formal easements according to the nuances of
state property law," and instead "followed our traditional rule: Because
the government appropriated a right to invade, compensation was due.
That same test governs here."4 2 While the Court was correct that in the
three decisions it cited, the Supreme Court did not consider specific state
law on easements, none of the three decisions cited support its holding
that any trespass constitutes a compensable taking. 43 In Causby, as
already mentioned, the Supreme Court also relied on evidence of
diminution of property value; 44 in Portsmouth, the Court based its holding
of a possible taking on its prior finding that allowing the War Department
to fire guns across the plaintiff hotel's property would "deprive the owner
of its profitable use of that property"; and in Loretto the Court applied a
"regulatory takings" analysis to find that a "permanent physical
occupation" of a landlord's roof by a cable installation (with possible
45
future multiple cable installations) was a taking.

39.
40.

See id.
See id (citing U.S. v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21 (1958)). Even though it's at best uncertain that

the Dow decision supports the proposition for which it's cited here, because the Supreme Court also
stated in that case that the government would obtain actual title to the property, a clear "property
interest" after paying the owner the just compensation required by the Fifth Amendment. See Dow,

357 U.S. at 21-22.
41. Cedar PointNursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2076.
42. See id. (first citing Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327
(1922); then citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); and then citing Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982)).
43. See generally Causby, 328 U.S. at 267; Portsmouth, 260 U.S. at 330; Loretto, 458 U.S. at
441.
44. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 267.
45. See Portsmouth, 260 U.S. at 329; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421.
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Part II, Subpart D of the decision was the last place where the Court
majority offered reasoning based on-as was true throughout the
decision-past Supreme Court decisions whose holdings did not really
support the Cedar Point Nursey conclusion about temporary trespasses
with no showings of financial harm.4 6 Especially striking was the Court's
reliance on Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncil,4 7 a decision in which the
Court's holdings, in an opinion by the late Justice John Paul Stevens, were
that a government's temporary moratorium on use of property was not a
per se taking, and that the regulatory takings analysis and not any
"categorical rule" should be applied to the moratorium. 4 8 It would take a
considerable leap of reasoning to equate the temporary and limited
trespasses authorized by the California regulation in CedarPointNursery
with the temporary moratoria in Tahoe-Sierra. Any fair reading of the
decisions the majority in CedarPointNursery relied on would support the
conclusion, implied by the dissent, that the majority created a new takings
standard in their decision. If that turns out to be so, then the Roberts Court
was not fully faithful to stare decisis, not for the first time and probably
not for the last.
The majority was more clearly faithful to stare decisis in the next
part of its decision, when explaining what it had not held. In rejecting the
defendant's and dissent's argument that the decision was inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, the majority opinion made significant points about property open
to the public. 49 The opinion recounted that given that California law (in
that case, the state's Constitution) was found to provide a right to engage
in leafleting at a private shopping center, the U.S. Supreme Court in its
decision had found that the protected access was a regulatory and not a
per se taking. 50 And that applying the Penn Central standard for
regulatory takings, the Court in PruneYard concluded that no
compensation was required for the access. 51 Tellingly, to support the
importance of public accessibility, Justice Roberts in CedarPointNursery
also cited the Court's 1964 decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel, 52 which
his opinion described as rejecting the claim that the Civil Rights Act of

46.

See Cedar PointNursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2077.

47. See id. (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
48.

See generally Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 302.

49.
50.
51.
52.

See CedarPoint Nursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2077.
See id. at 2076.
See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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1964's ban on racial discrimination in public accommodations was a Fifth
Amendment taking. 53 Based on these precedents, and other past Supreme
Court Taking clause decisions, the majority concluded that situations
involving businesses "generally open to the public" are "readily
distinguishable from regulations granting a right to invade property closed
to the public." 54 Given this section of the opinion's reliance on Heart of
Atlanta Motel as well as PruneYard, and the repeated references to "open
to the public" as the ground for distinguishing past cases, it's clear that
it's simply public accessibility-and not access for rights of expression or
status as a public forum, as some had argued to the Court in Cedar Point
and might try to argue again-that makes an access mandate a regulatory
rather than a per se taking. 55
The majority opinion later identified additional access mandates that
are not per se takings, while addressing what the majority called
"unfounded" charges by the defendant and the dissenting Justices that the
decision would "endanger a host of state and federal government activities
involving entry onto private property." 56 The majority opinion then
discussed multiple general situations of property access not treated as
takings, and included examples to illustrate.57 The majority did not say
or suggest that the expressly mentioned examples were intended to be
exhaustive, 58 and they should not be so treated in the future.
The first category that the majority discussed was access treated as
trespass but not as a taking. 59 The majority called these "[i]solated
physical invasions, not undertaken pursuant to a granted right of
access." 60 The majority stated that this trespass-not-takings distinction
was "firmly grounded in our precedent" and that it was this distinction
that explained the standard the Court had adopted for "governmentinduced temporary flooding" cases in 2012 in Arkansas Game and Fish
Commission v. United States.61 Justice Breyer's dissent, in commenting
on this set of exceptions, questioned what would be deemed "isolated,"
especially as it was apparently necessary to distinguish an "isolated

53. Cedar PointNursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2076.
54. See id at 2077 (first citing Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2015)
(distinguishing PruneYardas involving "an already publicly accessible" business); and then Nollan

v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 832, n.l (1987)).
55. Id.
56. See id. at 2078.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id. (discussing Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012)).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol39/iss1/3
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physical invasion" from the "temporary" invasions the Court majority had
elsewhere declared could be per se takings. 62
The second general situation the majority discussed was that
numerous physical invasions authorized by governments will not be
treated as Takings because they are "consistent with longstanding
background restrictions on property rights." 63 For this principle the Court
first relied on its 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 4 in which the Supreme Court had treated the common law of
nuisance as a "'pre-existing limitation upon the landowner's title."' 65 The
Supreme Court in both Lucas and CedarPoint Nursery reasoned that any
aspect or use of property that constitutes a nuisance was "always
unlawful" 66 and therefore such nuisance could be abated without
compensation. 67 In both decisions, the Court further found that physical
invasions by a private or governmental party would not be Takings if such
invasions were covered by common law torts defenses, such as public or
private necessity or the privilege to execute an arrest or enforce criminal

law. 68
As referenced in the preceding paragraph, both Lucas and Cedar
Point Nursery referred to "pre-existing limitations" as allowing physical
invasions without compensation. 69 But what does pre-existing mean?
Apparently not prior to the specific landowner taking title, because that
would make relevant whether Cedar Point Nursery owned the property
prior to the 1975 regulation authorizing trespass, a fact never discussed in
the decision. The Cedar Point Nursery majority did say that such
limitations "encompass common law privileges to access private

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id. at 2088 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2079.
Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
See Cedar PointNursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2079 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29).
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 (emphasis in original).

67. Cedar Point Nursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2079 (rephrasing that "[T]he government owes a
landowner no compensation for requiring him to abate a nuisance on his property, because he never
had a right to engage in the nuisance in the first place.").
68. See id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §196 (1964) (entry to prevent imminent public
disaster); § 197 (entry to prevent serious harm to a person, land, or chattels); Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 204-205 (privilege to enter property to effect an arrest or enforce the criminal law); see
Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286, 288 (1816) (no right to exclude a government official engaged in
a lawful and reasonable search); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (government-authorized physical
invasions of real property are not takings if they "do no more than duplicate the result that could have
been achieved in the courts - by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the
State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that
affect the public generally, or otherwise.")).

69.

CedarPoint Nursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2079.
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property." 70 This prompted the dissent to ask, "Just what [privileges] are
71
they? . . . Do only those exceptions that existed in, say, 1789 count?"
The dissent might have intended to be facetious but, in any event, drawing
that date line cannot be the answer because the "public necessity" defense
was not recognized in many U.S. states until the 1 9 th century.7 2
The third and final category of "non-takings" physical invasions
discussed by the CedarPointNursery decision was that "the government
may require property owners to cede a right of access as a condition of
receiving certain benefits, without causing a taking." 73 The "condition"
must also satisfy a standard: it must bear "an 'essential nexus' and 'rough
proportionality' to the impact of the proposed use of the property." 74 The
Court further explained that this category included "government health
and safety inspection regimes" because "[w]hen the government
conditions the grant of a benefit such as a permit, license, or registration
on allowing access for reasonable health and safety inspections, both the
nexus and rough proportionality requirements of the constitutional
conditions framework should not be difficult to satisfy." 75 The Court
probably did not literally mean that entry to property for an inspection or
other purpose was allowed, without requiring compensation, only for
activities requiring a "permit, license or registration. "76 That the Court
also meant to include other health and safety inspections was indicated by
its language, in the immediately following paragraph, contrasting such
inspections from the union organizer access that California required:
"And unlike standard health and safety inspections, the [California] access
regulation is not germane to any benefit provided to agricultural
77
employers or any risk posed to the public."
This article, while mostly avoiding extensive discussion of takings
jurisprudence, will now briefly examine the Cedar Point Nursery
majority's apparent effort to limit exceptions to takings to pre-defmed
categories, because it is relevant to labor law rules on access to property.

70.
71.

See id.
See id at 2089 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

72. See generally Derek T. Muller, Note, "As Much Upon Tradition as upon Principle":A
Critique of the Privilege of Necessity Destruction Under the Fifth Amendment, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 481 (2006); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §196 Reporter's Notes (citations showing
that public necessity was discussed only in "dicta" prior to the 19' century in England and in the

U.S.).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See
See
See
Id.
See

Cedar PointNursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2079.
id. (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386, 391 (1994)).
id
id at 2080.
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Limiting the exceptions to these categories will almost certainly prove to
be unsustainable, as so often happens with attempts to pre-define rules for
practically countless and varied situations. 78 The dissent in Cedar Point
Nursery demonstrated this with a long list of government-authorized
entries for inspection and other purposes that have never been found to
constitute a Taking, and many of which do not fit well into any of the
majority's categories. 79 In a December 2020 article, Professor John
Echeverria identified many more. 80 Consequently, if Chief Justice
Roberts and/or his colleagues in the CedarPoint Nursery majority insist
that the categories and examples stated in the majority opinion are to be
regarded as exhaustive and interpreted literally, that will at a minimum
generate an enormous amount of litigation and could also risk disrupting
countless existing laws and policies at all levels of government.
If instead, the line is to be drawn based on the majority's language
on entries being allowed if "germane to any benefit provided to" the
landowner or "any risk posed to the public," that creates the possibility of
the Supreme Court and other courts basing their takings decisions on little

78. An excellent example of this at the U.S. Supreme Court level is when one giant of the law
of torts, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, wrote a unanimously joined opinion that overruled a rule
fashioned only seven years earlier in a unanimous opinion by another torts law giant, Justice Oliver

Wendall Holmes, Jr. Justice Holmes in B. & O.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1927)
established a rule that a motorist approaching a railroad crossing must often get out of their vehicle
to look whether there is a "train dangerously near." By 1934 Justice Cardozo found that this
"Goodman rule" had "been a source of confusion" and disagreement in federal and state courts, and
therefore eliminated Justice Holmes' per se rule and held it should be a "jury question" regarding
what is reasonable for a motorist to do when approaching a railroad crossing. Pokora v. Wabash

Railway Co., 292 U.S. 98, 104, 105-06 (1934). Justice Cardozo explained, with the unanimous
agreement of his colleagues, that there is a:
need for caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law. The need is
the more urgent when there is no background of experience out of which the standards
have emerged. They are then, not the natural flowerings of behavior in its customary
forms, but rules artificially developed, and imposed from without.
See id. at 105.
The lesson here is not that stare decisis is always incorrect, but that experience-such as the
experience of motorists as in Pokora-should be considered when deciding whether to establish or
apply aper se rule. There is not yet any experience with applying Fifth Amendments Takings rules
to federal labor law, so it would be unwise for a court or agency to rely on Cedar Point Nursery to
repeal and revise existing federal labor law rules. As stated in the Dobbs, et. al. Casebook in
discussing this example of an attempted per se rule for torts law, "almost all rules of this kind have
come to grief, or have caused it." See Dan Dobbs, Paul Hayden & Ellen Bublick, Torts and
Compensation 133 (8' ed. 2017). This example seems especially apt to the situation of a state law
tort, that of trespass, being invoked against NLRA Section 7-protected "intruders" for violating a
property right also based on state law.

79.
80.

See Cedar PointNursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2087-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
John D. Echeverria, What is a PhysicalTaking?, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 731, 745 (2020).
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other than their own policy preferences. 8 1 This might have already
happened in Cedar Point Nursery itself, as the majority opinion
discounted without discussion that granting union organizers' access to
employer property could diminish any risk to the public, while the dissent
reasoned that the regulation could promote "labor peace" (thus reducing
the risk of agricultural employer-employee discord) and "community
health" (by reducing the risk of illness in the agricultural community). 82
The Fifth Amendment's Takings clause should not be used by Supreme
Court Justices or lower court judges to impose their own policy
preferences, which some scholars have already accused the Justices of
doing in CedarPointNursery.83
In sum, unless courts advance a revolution in constitutional
jurisprudence, the regulatory takings doctrine should, and almost certainly
will, survive Cedar Point Nursery and will be applied to permit
government-authorized inspections and other entries. And the Supreme
Court, as with the "balancing" standard discussed and applied in Babcock
& Wilcox, has already established that is the correct approach for federal
labor law.

II. CEDAR POINTNURSERY AND "UNION ACCESS" DECISIONS
A. Justice Kavanaugh's Concurrence in CedarPointNursery
Justice Kavanaugh wrote the only and non-joined concurring
opinion, in which he asserted that the majority's decision was "strongly
support[ed]" by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1956 decision in NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox. 84 He began his analysis by observing that in response
to the NLRB's position that the petitioner employers were required to
allow union organizers to access their private parking lots, some petitioner
employers had responded that this would violate "Fifth Amendment
property rights" when Congress "even if it could constitutionally do so,
has at no time shown any intention of destroying property rights secured
by the Fifth Amendment, in protecting employees' rights of collective

81.

See CedarPoint Nursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2089 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

82. Id.
83. See Erin Mayo Adam, The Supreme Court struck down a key UnitedFarm Workers win.
The
decision
has
some
infamous
echoes.,
WASH.
POST
(July
2,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/02/supreme-court-struck-down-key-united-farmworkers-win-decision-has-some-infamous-echoes/.
84. See Cedar PointNursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2080 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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bargaining under the Act." 85 Justice Kavanaugh next contended that the
Supreme Court in Babcock & Wilcox had "agreed with the employers'
argument that the [National Labor Relation] Act should be interpreted to
avoid unconstitutionality" and had "reasoned that 'the National
Government' via the Constitution 'preserves property rights,' including
'the right to exclude from property. "'86 Justice Kavanaugh followed this
with the claim that "[a]gainst the backdrop of the Constitution's strong
protection of property rights, the [Babcock & Wilcox] Court interpreted
the Act to afford access to union organizers only when "needed,"-that
is, when the employees live on company property and union organizers
have no other reasonable means of communicating with the employees." 87
Justice Kavanaugh concluded, "[a]s I read it, Babcock recognized that
employers have a basic Fifth Amendment right to exclude from their
private property, subject to a 'necessity' exception similar to that noted by
the Court today." 88
This interpretation of Babcock & Wilcox expressed by Justice
Kavanaugh is at best strained and very likely misconstrues that decision.
The CedarPointNursery majority apparently recognized that, because it
distinguished rather than relied on Babcock & Wilcox by pointing out that
Babcock & Wilcox "did not involve a takings claim" and added, "whatever
specific takings issues may be presented by the highly contingent access
right we recognized under the NLRA, California's access regulation
effects a per se physical taking under our precedents," for which the
89
majority cited Tahoe-Sierrarather than Babcock & Wilcox.
The apparent disagreement of the CedarPointNursery majority with
Justice Kavanaugh's views is well-justified. Justice Kavanaugh left a
great deal of important language from Babcock & Wilcox out of his
concurrence, and also probably mischaracterized some of the language he
did quote. 90 The Court decision in Babcock & Wilcox-as recognized by
the Cedar Point Nursery majority-never mentioned the Fifth
Amendment or takings. Babcock & Wilcox's full reference to "preserves

85. See id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 18-19, NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S.
105 (1956), (No. 250)).
86. See id. (quoting intermittently, NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (5th
Cir. 1956).
87. See id. (citing Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112, 113).
88. See id. (citing majority opinion in Cedar PointNursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2079).
89. See id. at 2077 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 322 (2002). Of course, the very fact that Justice Kavanaugh wrote a separate concurrence
might indicate that the Court majority did not agree with his view of the substance and sources of
access to employer property under the NLRA.
90. See supraPart II. A.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

13

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

86

[Vol. 39:1

property rights" was "organization rights are granted to workers by the
same authority, the National Government, that preserves property
rights." 91
The "organization rights" in that sentence are not (to date)
"preserved" by the U.S. Constitution and the referenced "property rights"
might not be meant to be constitutionally. preserved either. That these
"rights" might be equivalent in their bases (which could be Congress'
commitment to "preserve," as with-as just one example-providing for,
national defense) is supported by the next sentence in Babcock & Wilcox:
"accommodation between the two [sets of rights] must be obtained with
as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the
other." 92 Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence did not mention this balancing
between rights, but the Cedar Point Nursery majority did in explaining
why it rejected the defendant's argument that "Babcock's approach of
balancing property and organizational rights should guide our analysis"
of California's access regulation. 93 That is where the majority next held,
as mentioned above, 94 that whatever test the Court has applied under the
NLRA is different from what it was applying to that California
regulation. 95
Justice Kavanaugh omitted discussing multiple other holdings in
Babcock & Wilcox. First, he ignored the Court's reaffirmation of
employees' rights to engage in pro-union and other Section 7 activity on
privately owned property: "no restriction may be placed on the
employees' right to discuss self-organization among themselves, unless
the employer can demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to maintain
production or discipline." 96 Those important rights are discussed more
fully below. 97
Second, when Justice Kavanaugh discussed the holding of Babcock
& Wilcox that an employer's barring non-employee organizers from its
property depended on whether such organizers "have no other reasonable

91. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112.
92. Id.
&

93. Cedar PointNursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2077. This reference to Babcock involving "balancing"
is further evidence that the majority disagreed with Justice Kavanaugh's interpretation of Babcock

Wilcox.
94.

See supraPartH.A.

95. Cedar Point Nursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2077.
96. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 113 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S.
793, 803 (1945)).
97.

See infra Part III.
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&

means of communicating with the employees," 9 8 he did not quote that
decision's language, applicable to such organizers, that "[t]he right of selforganization depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn
the advantages of self-organization from others." 99 Third, Justice
Kavanaugh left out that the Babcock & Wilcox decision also
acknowledged that the employer could not "discriminate" against a union
in allowing access to engage in organizing.1 0 0 As discussed below, that
"no discrimination" rule still applies to union access to private
property.1 0 1 Finally, and perhaps more defensibly, Justice Kavanaugh did
not discuss that the Court in the Babcock & Wilcox decision, while
reversing the NLRB in this case, still stated that it would ordinarily defer
to the Board in interpreting the NLRA, including the "proper adjustment"
of NLRA rights with property rights. 10 2
In sum, the holdings and language in the Supreme Court's Babcock
& Wilcox decision do not support, and sometimes even conflict with, the
meaning that Justice Kavanaugh claimed for that decision in his Cedar
PointNursery concurrence.
The historical and constitutional context in which the Supreme Court
made its Babcock & Wilcox decision might also be relevant. Justice
Kavanaugh's interpretation would likely have surprised many of the
Justices who joined Justice Reed's opinion in the case. Within a few years
prior to Babcock & Wilcox, many of the same Justices had been on the
Court when it rejected Fifth Amendment Taking claims based on
condemnation of land for redevelopment even if only for "aesthetic"
104
purposes103 or on imposition of "maximum carload rates" on railroads,
or on Takings and Lanham Act claims based on property owners'
easements rights in land condemned to install sewerage.' 05 Nor did the
Babcock & Wilcox decision mark a change in the Court's approach to
government effects on property, as evidenced by the fact that only a week
later, Justice Reed-who authored the sole opinion in Babcock

98.

See CedarPoint Nursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2080 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citing Babcock

& Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 113).
99. See Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 113.
100. See id at 108.
101.

See infra PartII. C.

102.

See Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 111-12 ("the Board has the responsibility of 'applying

the Act's general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of events which might
be charged as violative of its terms.' . . . We are slow to overturn an administrative decision.... The
determination of the proper adjustments rests with the Board.").

103.
104.
105.

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-35 (1954).
Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States., 345 U.S. 146, 147-49 (1953).
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Fairfax Cnty., 345 U.S. 344 (1953).
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Wilcox-also wrote the majority opinion in GeneralBox Co. that rejected
a Takings claim by a timber owner because the confiscation of that timber
to build a levee was authorized by Louisiana law. 10 6 And to those who
might emphasize, as Justice Roberts did about certain dissents in Takings
cases, 107 that those decisions were "long ago," that does not change that
they were made close to the time Babcock & Wilcox was decided and by
a majority of the same Justices who decided Babcock & Wilcox. 108 Thus,
the language of Babcock & Wilcox, and the historical and constitutional
context in which it is decided in 1956, demonstrates that the decision was
not intended to mean and does not mean what Justice Kavanaugh in 2021
claimed it does.
B. The Lechmere Decision (U.S. 1992) & Nonemployee Union
Access

&

That Babcock & Wilcox has a more limited meaning is also shown
by the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of it in its 1992 decision in
110
In
Lechmere,1 09 which Justice Kavanaugh cited but did not discuss.
Lechmere the Court considered the Jean Country standard the Board had
developed for access of non-employee union organizers."' The Board
stated in Jean Country that with that standard it was seeking to reconcile
Babcock & Wilcox with the U.S. Supreme Court's later decisions in
Hudgens and CentralHardware.1 2 The Jean Country standard involved
the balance the Supreme Court had referenced as long as Babcock
Wilcox, between "the degree of impairment of the Section 7 right if access
should be denied" and "the degree of impairment of the private property
right if access should be granted," and added that "the availability of
reasonably effective alternative means" for the union to communicate
with employees or others was "especially significant in this balancing
process." 1 1 3 The Board that decided Jean Country and established a new

106. See General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U.S. 159 (1956).
107. See Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2078 (2021) (discussing Justice
Roberts's opinion's denigration of those dissenting opinions).

108. See id.
109. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537 (1992).
110.

See CedarPoint Nursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2070 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citing Lechmere,

502 U.S. at 540-51).
111.

See Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 531, 535-36 (describing the "three-factor balancing test" the

Board adopted in Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988)).
112. See Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 12 (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522
(1976) and citing Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972)).
113. Id. at 14.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol39/iss1/3

16

Hayes: Points about Cedar Point: What Labor Access Survives, and What Sh

2021 ]

POINTS ON CEDAR POINT: WHAT LABOR ACCESS SURVIVES

89

standard was comprised of three Republicans and one Democrat, and all
of whom had been appointed by Republican President Ronald Reagan.11 4
That did not save the Jean Country standard from being abrogated
by the Supreme Court four years later in Lechmere. The NLRB argued to
the Court in Lechmere that its Jean Country interpretation of Section 7 on
the issue of access of nonemployee organizers, which it had applied to
union organizers' access to the Lechmere store's parking lot, was entitled
to deference.1 1 5 The Lechmere majority opinion, by Justice Clarence
Thomas, agreed "[that] is certainly true,"1 1 6 but added-as courts are
wont to do-that the Court had to first decide whether the agency's
interpretation of the statute was "consistent with our past interpretation"
of the statute.1 1 7 The majority added, "once we have determined a
statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the
doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's later interpretation of
the statute against our prior determination of the statute's meaning." 1 18
The Lechmere Court then relied on Babcock & Wilcox as the key
interpretation of the Section 7 access rights of nonemployee union
organizers. 119
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court in Babcock & Wilcox held
that an employer could not "discriminate" against a union in allowing
access to its property to try to organize employees. 120 The Lechmere
majority correctly recognized that the discrimination issue was not present
in its case by pointing out in the first footnote of its decision that the
employer Lechmere had "consistently enforced" its policy barring
soliciting, distribution of literature or trespassing by non-employees
inside its store or in its parking lot "against, among others, the Salvation
Army and the Girl Scouts." 12 1 The Court in Lechmere found regarding
Babcock & Wilcox that in that decision it had held as to nonemployee
organizers that "the Board was not permitted to engage in [the] same
balancing" the Board applied to employees. 122 The Lechmere Court

114.

See

Chart of "Members

of the NLRB

Since

1935,"

NLRB,

https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/the-board/members-of-the-nrb-since-1935

available

at
(last

visited Nov. 23, 2021).
115. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 536.
116. Id.
117. Id
118. Id at 536-37 (quoting Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116,
131 (1990)).
119. See id at 537.
120. See Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 107-08, 113).
121.

See Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 530 n.1.

122. See id at 537.
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further held that "Babcock's teaching is straightforward: §7 simply does
not protect nonemployee union organizers except in the rare case where
'the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable
attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual
channels.."'12 3 The Lechmere Court then explained that this standard's
"reference to 'reasonable' attempts was nothing more than a
commonsense recognition that unions need not engage in extraordinary
feats to communicate with inaccessible employees-not an endorsement
of the view (which we expressly rejected) that the Act protects
12 4
"reasonable" trespasses."
When the Court in Lechmere turned to applying its legal standard to
the facts of the case, it held, again relying on Babcock & Wilcox, that
union organizers' Section 7 right to access property "does not apply
wherever nontrespassory access to employees may be cumbersome or
less-than-ideally effective, but only where 'the location of a plant and the
living quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of
125
The Court next
reasonable union efforts to communicate with them."'
identified as "[c]lassic examples" of this rule authorizing access such
employer properties as "logging camps, mining camps and mountain
resort hotels." 126 Although Babcock had referred to inaccessible plant
location and "living quarters," without stating that those "quarters" must
be owned or possessed by the employer, the Court in Lechmere declared
that, "[b]ecause the employees do not reside on Lechmere's property, they
are presumptively not beyond the reach of the union's message."127 This
presumption based on employees not living on employer property was
8
new. 12
The Court in Lechmere specifically found that the fact that
employees lived in a large metropolitan area "[did] not in itself render
129
The Court
them 'inaccessible' in the sense contemplated by Babcock."
instead found that the employees' "accessibility is suggested by the
union's success in contacting a substantial percentage of them directly,
via mailings, phone calls, and home visits."130 The Court immediately
made clear, however, that contact through these means was not required

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id (quoting Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112).
id.
id at 539 (quoting Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 113).
id
id at 540.
id
id
id
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to preclude access, by stating "such direct contact, of course, is not a
necessary element of 'reasonably effective' communication; signs or
advertising also may suffice." 13 1 The Court did not rule on the Board's
finding that local newspaper advertising was not reasonably effective
because it was costly and uncertain to reach employees, but found such a
ruling was unnecessary because the union's use of signs--even if
displayed from the public grassy strip next to Lechmere's parking lotwere sufficient means to share its message with employees.1 32
Justice Byron White, who, at the time Lechmere was decided, was
the only Justice appointed by a Democratic President, dissented, joined by
Justice Harry Blackmun. 133 Justice White maintained that the majority
had misapplied Babcock, reasoning "that Babcock stated that
inaccessibility would be a reason to grant access does not indicate that
there would be no other circumstance that would warrant entry to the
employer's parking lot and would satisfy the [Babcock] Court's
admonition that accommodation must be made with as little destruction
of property rights as is consistent with the right of employees to learn the
advantages of self-organization from others."1 34 Justice White agreed that
under Babcock a union must show that its "reasonable efforts" without
access had "not permit{ted] proper communication with employees."1 35
But Justice White questioned that this access should be limited to as
extreme "inaccessible" locations as logging camps.1 36 In addition, Justice
White contended that Babcock also did not require "ignor[ing] the
substantial difference between the entirely private parking lot of a
secluded manufacturing plant and a shopping center lot which is open to
the public without substantial limitation " or ignoring the fact that
employees' residences are scattered throughout a major metropolitan
area." 13 7 Justice White pointed out that "Babcock itself relied on the fact
that the employees in that case lived in a compact area which made them
easily accessible."1 38
Turning to Section 7, Justice White correctly observed that "the
Court in Babcock recognized that actual communication with
nonemployee organizers, not mere notice that an organizing campaign

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See
See
See
See
See
See
Id.
See

id.
id.
id. at 541.
id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).
id at 54243 (White, J., dissenting).
id at 543.
id.
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exists, is necessary to vindicate §7 rights."1 39 Also quoting Babcock's
language that employees have a right to "learn from others the advantages
of self-organization," Justice White found it was "singularly unpersuasive
to suggest that the union has sufficient access for this purpose by being
able to hold up signs from a public grassy strip adjacent to the highway
leading to the parking lot."1 40
C. Nonemployee Union Access Since Lechmere
1. Inaccessibility
As Justice White's position favoring broader access was in a dissent
in Lechmere, that broader view of a right to enter property to "access"
employees obviously did not become law. 14 1 A right for union agents to
enter property because employees would otherwise be "inaccessible" to
union communication is rarely found because few situations have been
found to meet Lechmere's standard that both the employees' workplace
and residence locations must put them beyond the reach of reasonable
efforts to communicate.1 42 Since Lechmere was decided, the Board has
found inaccessibility met only in a case involving the Laborers union's
efforts to communicate with employees of an oil drilling company who
lived and worked in oil fields in remote parts of Alaska. 143 A few years
later the NLRB General Counsel found that the exception was met when
the employees with whom the union sought to communicate lived and
worked on a vessel at sea. 144 Any future applications of the
"inaccessibility" exception would have to be similar to these, and also
would likely have to involve employees in locations where contact
through social media is not possible.

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Robert Carrol & Paul Lynd, Supreme Court: California Can't Require Union Access to
Employer's
Premises
for
Organizing,
JD
SUPRA
(Jul.
6,
2021),
93
2 6
https://www.jdsupra.com/leganews/supreme-court-califomia-can-t-require- 0 55 /.

142. See infra pp. 100-01.
143. See Nabors Alaska Drilling Inc., 325 N.L.R.B. 574 (1998).
144. Advice Memorandum from N.L.R.B., Office of the General Counsel to James G. Paulsen,
Acting Regional Director and Rodney Johnson, Assistant to the Reg'l Director, Region 15 (June 19,

2002) (on file with journal).
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2. Non-Discrimination
As discussed earlier, the NLRA "non-discrimination rule" on access
to property was acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1956 in
Babcock & Wilcox 145 and reserved on in 1992 in Lechmere.1 46 Currently,
after the Board's split decision in 2019 in Kroger Ltd. PartnershipI MidAtlantic (hereinafter "Kroger"), the scope of the non-discrimination rule
is uncertain. 14 7 As then-Board Member, now Board Chair Lauren
McFerran pointed out in her lone dissent, the Board for more than seventy
years had interpreted non-discrimination as meaning that if an employer
allowed nonunion outside organizations (e.g. Girl Scouts, the Salvation
Army) on its property to solicit and/or to distribute literature or tangible
items, the employer had to give union representatives access to the same
extent. 148 However, as the Board majority in Kroger discussed, at least
four federal courts of appeal disagreed with that position and held, on a
variety of different grounds, that an employer could permit nonunion
outside groups on its property without its bar of union representatives
being unlawfully discriminatory. 149 The Board majority acknowledged
that two federal appeals courts, one being the D.C. Circuit to which all
Board decisions can be appealed, 150 had agreed with the Board that if
nonunion outside groups were allowed access to the employer's property,
then union representatives must also be allowed access to some extent. 15 1
The Board majority ultimately decided that even when an employer had
allowed outside organizations on its property to engage in solicitation
and/or distribution, an employer did not have to permit union
152
representatives access to solicit customers to boycott the employer.
145. See supra pp. 87-88 (discussing the Babcock & Wilcox decision's recognition of the nondiscrimination rule).
146. See supranote 121 and accompanying text (describing the footnote in which the Lechmere
court found the non-discrimination rule inapplicable because no outside groups had been allowed
access to the property).
147. See infra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.

148. Kroger Ltd. P'ship I Mid-Atlantic, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 64, slip op. at 19-21 (2019)
(McFerran, Member, dissenting); see also United Aircraft Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 594, 602-04 (1946)
(holding that an employer committed unfair labor practice when it excluded union organizers from
property but permitted access to various commercial solicitors).

149. See Kroger, 368 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 4-7.
150. See NLRA §10 (f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) ("Any person aggrieved by a final order of the
Board ... may obtain a review of such order in any United States court of appeals in the circuit
wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such
person resides or transacts business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia .") (emphasis added).

151. See Kroger, 368 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 6.
152. See id. at 10-11.
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The Board majority also stated, in what could be regarded as dicta, that
even if an employer permitted access to outside nonunion groups to
engage in fundraising, it could still bar union organizers' access to engage
in organizing activities unless it allowed access to other outside nonunion
groups to recruit members. 153
The union appealed the Board's Kroger decision to the D.C. Circuit
but limited its appeal to the question (also raised in dissent by then
Member McFerran) whether the employer's denial of access could be
found unlawful based on "animus" against the union.' 5 4 In March 2021,
a D.C. Circuit panel rejected the union's appeal on the ground that the
"animus" argument had not been fully raised to or considered by the
Board.'
While at present the scope of the non-discrimination rule is in doubt,
there are some aspects of it that are settled unless changed by the Supreme
Court or Congress. One is that the fact that property is open to the public
does not necessarily allow union representatives a right to access it. That
was made clear by the facts of Lechmere, in which the employer
department store (and its parking lot) were open to the general public,
unlike the factory (and parking lot) the Supreme Court considered in
Babcock & Wilcox. 15 6 So Lechmere authorized barring union organizers
from property during business hours when nearly all other persons would
be allowed access at such times, even though that is "discriminatory" on
some level." 7 However, as mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court in the
same decision reserved on whether allowing property access to outside
groups would make it "discriminatory" to bar unions. 15 8
So far the Board in Kroger has narrowed the non-discrimination rule
by holding it's not unlawful for an employer to allow outside groups on
153. See id at 15. But see also id. at 8 n.13 (distinguishing two courts of appeals decision finding
discrimination in access to property on the ground that "Both cases . . involved union organizational
activities, rather than boycott activities like those at issue in this case."). Given how the Board
distinguished these two decisions, and that the facts of the Kroger case did involve union requests for
a boycott, the Board's brief statement on this issue, that allowing nonunion outside groups property
access would not be discriminatory against union organizers unless the nonunion groups were also
seeking to "organize" membership, should be treated as dicta. Especially because the Board did not
offer any further explanation of whether this standard would apply when, for example, while Girl
Scouts are selling cookies they also take down contact information from parents and children about
the latter joining the Scouts (which the author has witnessed happening), that "triggers" discrimination
if union organizers are denied access.

154. See id. at 9.
155. See Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 400 v. NLRB, 989 F.3d 1034, 1038 (D.C.
Cir. 2021).
156. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533 (1992).
157. See id. at 535.
158. See id.
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its property but ban a union that urges a customer boycott of the
business. 159 That could be recharacterized as a rule that allows employers
to discriminate in access to property against nonemployee persons seeking
to harm the employer's business. Even if that were the rule, however, it
should be remembered that when unions urge customer boycotts they
usually are not asking for a permanent boycott but one that will end as
soon as the employer begins treating its employees better in some way. 160
In her dissent in Kroger, Member McFerran contended that a union
boycott for this purpose is "protected concerted activity" under Section 7
and an employer should therefore be found to have committed unlawful
discrimination or interference (or both) when barring union
representatives from communicating this message, at least when this
employer permits other nonunion groups to communicate with
customers. 16 1
Whatever happens in the future regarding boycott cases, one
principle that should be understood in any correct application of the
NLRA is that the "harmful to employer" standard should not be used to
authorize differential treatment in access between union organizers and
representatives from other outside groups. That would be inconsistent
with the NLRA and therefore national labor relations policy because no
matter what an enterprise's owner or officials might think about union
organizers, they are advancing the Section 7 right of the employer's
employees as established by Congress and recognized by the U.S.
Supreme Court. 162
As both the Board majority and Member McFerran in dissent
discussed in Kroger, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in 2008 held that the scope of the non-discrimination rule was that
"the private property owner must treat a nonemployee who seeks to
communicate on a subject protected by Section 7 less favorably than
159. Kroger Ltd. P'ship I Mid-Atlantic, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 64, slip op. 1 (2019).
160. See generally id. (discussing the facts of that case and the facts of "boycott" cases revealed
that the union message is that the boycott will continue until the employer makes some
improvement(s) in treatment of employees).
161. See id at 11, 16, n.l1, n.25 (McFerran, Member, dissenting). See also UPMC, 368
N.L.R.B. No. 2 (2019) (Member McFerran, again dissenting, maintained that it amounted to unlawful
discrimination for an employer to prohibit nonemployee union organizers from accessing a hospital's
cafeteria to speak with employees when other nonemployee members of the public representatives to
access).
162. Member McFerran made this point in her dissent in Kroger, as when stating that the Board
majority standard "abandons any attempt to safeguard statutory rights, sacrificing them instead to the
employer's property rights [and that it] is inconceivable that this is what the Supreme Court in
Stowe Spinning or Babcock & Wilcox contemplated, much less what Congress intended when it
enacted Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act." See Kroger, 368 N.L.R.B. slip op. at 26.
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another person communicating on the same subject." 163 Even the Kroger
Board majority held that this was too narrow a definition because, they
reasoned, a standard that would allow an outside group to urge customers
to boycott an enterprise for a non-Section 7 related reason (e.g. an
environmental protest) while barring union agents from access to
encourage a boycott over a labor issue "insufficiently accounts for the
protection of Section 7 interests" and such differential treatment also
"supports an inference of hostility to union activity rather than legitimate
opposition to any group that seeks to injure the employer's business
interests." 1 64 That analysis is sound. Moreover, the Second Circuit
standard could cause confusion in the application of the "no equal time"
doctrine that allows employers to deliver anti-union messages at meetings
with employees without permitting union representatives access to do the
same,16 5 at least when nonemployees are also permitted to communicate
Or perhaps even when anti-union nonsupervisory
those messages.
employees are given more "access" to communicate with employees than
are pro-union ones.
For now, both unions and employers must proceed with caution if
either want to rely on their view of the scope of the non-discrimination
rule.
3. Negotiated Access Rights
Union employees and representatives have a right to access property
when their union represents employees working there, because an
employer must grant reasonable access to union representatives whenever
such access is relevant to the union's functions of representing those
workers. Such access is a mandatory subject of bargaining, meaning that
an employer must negotiate over access and the extent of it at the union's
request and, after the union and employer have agreed on the extent of
and conditions for access, the employer cannot unilaterally make any
changes in those terms, 166 even after the collective bargaining agreement

163. See Run Shopping Center LLC v. NLRB, 534 F.3d 108, 116 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoted in
Kroger, slip op. at 6, 10 by majority and at slip op. at 23, n.50 by dissenting Member McFerran).
164. Kroger, 368 N.L.R.B. slip op. at 10.
165. See The Developing Labor Law § 6.II.B.1.F (2020).
166. See, e.g., CP Anchorage Hotel 2, LLC, d/b/a Hilton Anchorage, 370 N.L.R.B No. 83, 2223 (2021); Meadowlands Hotel, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 119, 1 (2019).
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expires.1 6 7 The right of access for union representatives can even be based
on a past practice if there is no written agreement providing for it. 168
That unions representing employees are entitled to access the
employer property where those employees work should not be surprising,
especially given that unions have a legal obligation to "fairly represent"
employees, an obligation the U.S. Supreme Court imposed more than
seventy-five years ago.1 69 A union cannot represent employees fairly
unless its representatives can see and experience in person the conditions
under which those employees work, and can have access to anything in
the employer's possession that directly impacts employees' terms of
employment. Therefore, unions must still be able to obtain through
negotiations with employers a right of access to property and any
reasonable conditions employers might demand for such access. 170
4. Some "Publicly Accessible" Property Under State Law
As discussed earlier in the examination of CedarPoint Nursery, the
Supreme Court majority distinguished and left undisturbed the Court's
1980 decision in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 17 1 in which the
Court had treated as a "regulatory taking," requiring no compensation to
the property owner, an interpretation of the state's Constitution that
established a right to engage in leafleting at a private shopping center. 172
Cedar Point Nursery, also relying on Heart of Atlanta Motell7 3 for the
proposition, held that with regard to the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause, enterprises "generally open to the public" are distinguishable from
those that are usually closed to the public. 174
In California, "nonemployee" union representatives can and have
relied on the state law right of access to enter shopping centers and malls,
even to urge boycotts. 175 Other states in which union "nonemployee"
167. See, e.g., valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 369 N.L.R.B. No. 16 (2020).
168. See, e.g., SMI/Division of DCX-CHOL Enter. Inc., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 152 (2017).
169. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); see also Miranda Fuel Co.,
140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962) (establishing that a union's breach of this "duty of fair representation" was
an unfair labor practice).

170. See, e.g., CP Anchorage Hotel 2, 370 N.L.R.B No. 83, slip op. at 22-23; Meadowlands
Hotel, 368 N.L.R.B. at 1.
171. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2076-77 (2021).
172. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
173. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
174.

See Cedar PointNursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2076.

175.

See, e.g., Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 172 P.3d 742, 754 (Cal. 2007) (mall owners

could not prevent union members who worked for an employer not located in the mall from leafleting
in front of a store to urge customers to boycott the store).
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union representatives under current state law might also have rights to
access similarly "publicly accessible" properties to engage in solicitation
include Colorado1 76 and New Jersey.1 77 In these, and any other states in
the future that might recognize rights of access to specific types of private
property to engage in "expressive" activities, nonemployee union
representatives could possibly access private property to organize
employees and/or to solicit and distribute literature to customers and
members of the public. 17 8
III. ACCESS RIGHTS OF WORKERS

A. Access Rights of Employees When Their Employer is the
Landowner
79
In 1945 the U.S. Supreme Court in its Republic Aviation decision1
established the rule, ever since in place, that employees, when both the
speaker(s) and the listeners(s) are on non-working time, have a right to
engage in pro-union or other Section 7-protected oral solicitation. 180 That
decision also set the still-existing rule that employees have a right to wear
or display pro-union, or Section 7-protected, apparel or "insignia" (as on
pins or buttons).181 Both sets of rights are subject to employer restriction
when "necessary in order to maintain production or discipline."1 82 For
more than sixty years, employees also have had the right to distribute prounion or other Section 7-protected literature or other tangible items
(including again buttons, caps/hats, etc.) in non-working areas during nonworking times, subject again to limitations necessary for production and
discipline.1 83 Some special exceptions to all these rules have been

176. See New Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 61-3 (Colo. 1991) (at least where a
city participated financially in the development of a private shopping mall, and government agencies
have an "active presence" in common areas of mall, the mall must permit access by political

"leafleters").
177. Green Party of New Jersey v. Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc., 752 A.2d 315 (N.J. 2000); New
Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty, 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 812 (1995).
178.

See e.g., cases cited supra notes 175-7.

179. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
180. See id. at 803-05; see also Harbor Freight Tools, USA, Inc., 2021 WL 961659 (ALJ Gerald
M. Etchingham) (2021) (applying this rule from Republic Aviation).
181. See Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 803-04.
182. See id. at 803 n.10.
183. See, e.g., Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697 (1960), enforced, 289 F.2d 177 (5th Cir.
1961); see also Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 615-621 (1962).
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adopted for patient-care areas in hospitals 184 or for "selling floors" in
retail stores. 185 Since then, any controversy over these rights for
employees during working hours has largely been limited to under what
circumstances "production or discipline" justifies, or does not, their
limitation. 186
By contrast, when employees are at their workplace at times other
than their scheduled hours, their rights to engage Section 7-protected
activity are more limited or, in the case of so-called "subcontractor"
employees who work at locations not owned or managed by their direct
employer, at present unknown. 18 7 With regard to access of "off-duty"
employees to a location where they work and their employer is the
"landowner," the Board has allowed some rights of access, since 1976
based on the rule it adopted that year in Tri-County Medical.188 In that
decision the Board held that "except where justified by business reasons,
a rule which denies off-duty employees entry to parking lots, gates, and
other outside nonworking areas will be found invalid." 189 The Board has
continued to follow and enforce this right of access. 190
The same right of access applies for employees who work at one
location when they seek access to another location of their employer, to
that location's parking lot or other outside nonworking areas. 19 1 In its
1995 decision in U.S. PostalService192 the Board specifically rejected the
employer's argument that off-site employees were comparable to
nonemployee organizers, and pointed out that the Supreme Court has held
that employees engaged in protected activity at another location of their
employer retain the legal status as employees of that employer and "not
outsiders."1 93

184. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
185. See Stoddard-QuirkMfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. at 617 n.4.
186. See generally The Developing Labor Law §§ 6.II.B.1.C. & 6.I.B.1.E. (2020).
187.

188.
189.
190.
N.L.R.B.
191.

See infra notes 267-301 and accompanying text.

See Tri-Cnty. Medical Center, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1976).
Id.
See, e.g., Bemis Co., Inc., 370 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (2020); EYM King of Michigan, LLC, 366
156 (2018).
See, e.g., ITT Indus., Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 937 (2004), enforced, 413 F.3d 64 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

(finding unlawful employer's denial of parking lot access to offsite employees seeking to solicit and
distribute for organizational purposes); Hillhaven Highland House, 336 N.L.R.B. 646, enforced sub

nom, First Healthcare Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2003) (unfair labor practice found when
employer barred its employees from accessing outside nonwork area of facilities other than those at
which the employees worked).

192. Postal Service, 318 N.L.R.B. 466 (1995).
193. See id. (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976)).
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Employers seeking to diminish the access rights of their own
employees are not the only persons who have expressed interest in
changing these rules. In 2018 Board Member Emanuel in EYMKing of
Mich., LLC declared that he believed "that the Board should revisit TriCounty Medical Centerto the extent that it allows off-duty employees to
engage in Section 7 activities on an employer's parking lot and other
exterior areas of the employer's property." 94 The next year in Southern
Bakeries19 5 Member Kaplan joined Member Emanuel jn expressing
interest in "reconsidering" Tri-County, and more specifically the "third
prong" that differentiates off-duty access for "union activities" from
access for other purposes.1 9 6 The issue in Southern Bakeries was a rule
found to give the employer "unlimited discretion" to bar off-duty
employees from its property, even from outdoor areas to engage in Section
7-protected activities, 197 so it's reasonable to infer that Members
Emanuel and Kaplan sought to consider giving employers such
discretion. 198
The possible rationale for changing the 45-year-old Tri-County rule
was not and to date has not been identified. Changing.the rule could not
be justified by technological or other workplace changes that allegedly
make it difficult to distinguish between working and non-working time;
the interactions of off-duty and off-site employees with co-workers would
be in-person and during non-working time, like those in Republic
Aviation. 199 Members Emanuel and Kaplan apparently just wanted to
reset the "balance" between employees' right to exercise their Section 7
right and the employer's "property right" to exclude specific persons from
its property. 200 The balance they question has not only been applied for
decades by the Board but has been upheld by the D.C. Circuit and other
federal courts 2 0 1 as consistent with the Supreme Court's NLRA access
decisions Babcock & Wilcox and Lechmere.
194. EYM King of Michigan, 366 N.L.R.B. 156, n.8 (2018).
195. Southern Bakeries, 368 N.L.R.B. 59 n.5 (2019).
196. See id at 2 n.4.

1-2.

197.

See id at

198.
199.

See id at 2 n.5.
See, e.g., Caesars Entertainment, 368 N.L.R.B. 143, slip op. at 7 (2019) (asserting that

employee use of and access to employer's e-mail system makes it more difficult to distinguish
between working and nonworking time).

200.

Cf NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 109-110 (5th Cir. 1956) (finding that

in Republic Aviation the Board and Supreme Court had "balanced the conflicting interests of
employees to receive information on self-organization on the company's property from fellow
employees during nonworking time, with the employer's right to control the use of his property.").

201. See, e.g., Alcoa, Inc. v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2017); see also First Healthcare
Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.3d 523, 538-40 (6th Cir. 2003).
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The D.C. Circuit in 2001 in ITT Industries, Inc v. NLRB 202
recognized that the access rights of "off-duty" employees were "wellestablished" and had been approved by other federal appeals courts. 203
Turning to the issue of "off-site" employees, the D.C. Circuit first
discussed that with regard to access to property, the key distinction that
the Supreme Court drew in Lechmere was not between "invitees" and
trespassers, or any non-labor law categories, but between employees and
nonemployces as defined in the NLRA. 204 The D.C. Circuit further
explained that while the Supreme Court "never has professed to define the
scope of the term 'employee"' in Lechmere or other decisions relating to
employee rights on employer property, these decisions "certainly do not
stand for the proposition that all trespassers, whether they be
nonemployee union organizers or off-site employees, possess only
derivative §7 access rights." 20 5 Consequently, the D.C. Circuit in that
decision found that "off-site employees might enjoy some measure of
free-standing, nonderivative access rights" but that would depend on the
Board providing "considered justifications" for recognizing greater access
rights for those employees than for "trespassing nonemployee union
organizers." 206 The court remanded the case to offer such "justifications"
if it could, 207 and in review of the Board's second decision in the case, the
D.C. Circuit found reasonable the Board's rationales and reasoning, in ITT
Industries and other decisions, for why off-site employees should have
access rights to outdoor areas of locations of their employer where they
did not work. 208
In the D.C. Circuit's "second" ITT Industries decision it quoted
approvingly 209 the Board's language that the off-site employees "'are not
only 'employees' within the broad scope of Section 2(3) of the [NLRA],"'
they are "'employees of the employer who would exclude them from its
property."' 2 10 The court also quoted the Board's explanation, in the ITT
decision on remand itself, that "'when offsite employees seek to organize
202. ITT Industries, Inc. v NLRB, 251 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
203. See id. at 999 (citing NLRB v. S. Md. Hosp. Ctr., 916 F.2d 932, 939-40 (4th Cir.1990);
NLRB v. Ohio Masonic Home, 892 F.2d 449, 453 (6th Cir.1989); NLRB v. Pizza Crust Co. of Pa.,
862 F.2d 49, 52-55 (3d Cir.1988)).
204. See id at 1002 (citing and quoting Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 532, 537 (1992)).
205. Id. at 1003.
206. See id. at 1004.
207. See id. at 1005, 1007.
208. See generally id. at 64 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
209. In introducing the language it quoted from Board decisions explaining why off-site
employees had rights of access, the D.C. Circuit stated, "the Board not only explained that conclusion,
it did so reasonably." See id at 70.

210.

See id. at 70 (quoting Hillhaven, 336 N.L.R.B. 646, 648 (2001)).
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similarly situated employees at another employer facility, the employees
seek strength in numbers to increase the power of their union and
The D.C.
ultimately to improve their own working conditions." 2
Circuit reasoned that this validated why off-site employees should have
greater property access rights than nonemployee organizers: "This
reasonably explains the Board's conclusion that the right claimed by such
off-site employees is personal rather than derivative: employees who seek
to make common cause with similarly situated employees of the same
employer are seeking to advance their own interests-not just those of the
employees they target, as is the case for nonemployee organizers."212
Having discussed the "employee right" side of the balance, the D.C.
Circuit found also that the Board also paid reasonable attention to the
"employer property" side of the balance as well. 213 The D.C. Circuit
explained that because the Board had recognized that "the situation of
offsite employees implicates some distinct considerations' from that of
either nonemployees or on-site employees" and that the employer's
interests and rights were protected because offsite employees were
employed by the property owner and consequently that employer "'has a
lawful means of exercising control over the offsite employee (even
regarded as trespasser), independent of its property rights."' 2 14 The court
added, "[t]hat ability to exercise control provides a reasonable basis for
the Board's conclusion that permitting access by off-site employees
trenches less seriously on the employer's property interests than would
permitting access by nonemployees." 215 Finally, the D.C. Circuit also
noted that the Board had acknowledged that due to concerns such as
"security, traffic control, personnel, and like issues" 2 16 a property owner
employer might have "heightened private property-right concerns when
offsite (as opposed to onsite) employees seek access to its property to
exercise their Section 7 rights," and that the Board would take those into
account.217

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id at 70-71 (quoting ITT Remand Decision, 341 N.L.R.B. 937, 939 (2004)).
id at 71.
id
id at 72 (quoting Hillhaven, 336 N.L.R.B. at 649).
id.
id. at 73 (quoting Hillhaven, 336 N.L.R.B. at 649-50).
id. (quoting ITT Remand Decision, 341 N.L.R.B. at 939).
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B. Access Rights (ifany) of Employees Who Perform Work at
Another One or More Employers' Locations

&

Starting in 2002 the D.C. Circuit considered another Board standard on
worker access to property-this time the rights of access of subcontractor
employees working at a property owner's location 2 18 -- and again after a
remand eventually upheld the standard the Board adopted. 219 In its 2001
decision in the case, the Board had found that because employees of the
Ark restaurant subcontractor within the New York New York Hotel and
Casino worked "regularly and exclusively" at that location, they had an
"off-duty" right of access to inside and outside nonwork areas to engage
in the protected activity of area standards handbilling. 220 In reviewing
these decisions in 2002, the D.C. Circuit, based on its 2001 ITTIndustries
decision discussed above, 221 repeated that the key distinction in cases
involving worker access to property was between "employees" and
"nonemployees." 222 The court observed that with no U.S. Supreme Court
decision yet having decided the property access rights of employees of
contractors on another employer's property (still true in 2021), there were
multiple questions the Board's decisions, and the precedents it cited, had
failed to answer about the nature of the rights of such workers. 22 3 The
court therefore remanded the decision to the Board to address such
224
questions.
It took the Board more than eight years to issue the decision doing
so, but in March 2011 the Board did that in New York New York Hotel
Casino.22 5 The Board adopted the standard that a property owner could
not deny access to "nonworking areas open to the public, the off-duty
employees of a contractor who are regularly employed on the property in
work integral to the owner's business, who seek to engage in
organizational handbilling directed at potential customers of the employer
and the property owner."226 The reference to "organizational" handbilling
suggests that this standard was also intended to apply to contractor

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See generally New York New York, LLC v. NLRB, 313 F.3d 585 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
See New York-New York, LLC v. NLRB, 676 F. 3d 193 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
See In re New York-New York Hotel, LLC, 334 N.L.R.B. 762, 762-63, 772 (2001).
ITT Industries, Inc. v NLRB, 251 F.3d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
See New York-New York LLC, 313 F.3d at 588.
See id at 588-91.
Id. at 590-91.
See New York, New York Hotel & Casino, 356 N.L.R.B. 907 (2011). Hereinafter the

respondent landowner in that case will be referred to as "NYNY," and the Board's 2011 decision will
be referred to as NYNY.

226.

See id. at 918.
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employees who solicit and distribute handbills to workers and not just
customers, and indeed on review the D.C. Circuit noted that equally
protected were handbillers seeking support from other workers and
seeking support from customers and members of the public. 227 The Board
also added that an employer could deny property access to contractor
employees even under these circumstances if and when the employer
"demonstrate[d] that the employees' activity significantly interferes with
[the employer's] use of the property or where exclusion is justified by
another legitimate business reason, including, but not limited to, the need
to maintain production and discipline." 2 28
In explaining why employees of subcontractors should have the
property access rights embodied by its new standard, the Board stated
multiple reasons why such employees were more similar to employees of
a property's owner than they are to the "nonemployee organizers" whose
229
The
rights to access property are limited by the Lechmere decision.
first one they mentioned is that, unlike nonemployee organizers, a
subcontractor's employees do not seek property access "for the purpose
of urging others to exercise their Section 7 rights" but instead are
"statutorily protected employees directly exercising their own Section 7
Following up on this mention of
right to self-organization." 23 0
subcontractor's employees Section 7 rights, the Board next decried the
unfairness to subcontractor employees if they were treated like
nonemployee organizers, because such employees "who work regularly
on another employer's property would be accorded diminished rights
based merely on the location of their workplace, without any showing that
the resulting limitations on the employees' rights are necessary to protect
any legitimate interests of their employer or the property owner." 23 1 This
reduction of rights, the Board pointed out, "would be most problematic"
for the many types of subcontractor employees who work for employers
on property their employer does not own and/or don't even have a "fixed
place of work." 23 2 As an example, the Board gave "janitors employed by
a cleaning company" who might regularly work in one or more office
227. See New York-New York, LLC v. NLRB, 676 F. 3d 193, 196-97 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("neither
this court nor the Board has ever drawn a substantive distinction between solicitation of fellow
employees and solicitation of nonemployees. To the contrary, both we and the Board have made clear
that NLRA sections 7 and 8(a)(1) protect employee rights to seek support from nonemployees."')

(quoting Stanford Hospital & Clinics v. NLRB, 325 F.3d 334, 343 (D.C.Cir.2003)).
228. See NYNY, 356 N.L.R.B. at 918-19.
229. Id. at 919.
230. See id. at 912.
231. See id.
232. See id.
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buildings their employer does not own but who "should not be denied
Section 7 rights on the sole grounds that they work on the property of an
employer [or employers] other than their own." 233
Next discussing statutory language, the Board observed that the
NLRA "expressly does not require that employees be employed by a
particular employer in order to confer rights on the employees or impose
obligations on the employer to respect the employees' rights." 234 The
Board declared . it rejected "establish[ing] such a requirement
administratively" because that would "relegate[] some workers to secondclass status under the [NLRA] based solely on the location of their
work." 23 5 The Board then explained it was significant-and consistent
with its standard requiring "regular employment" at a location-that the
subcontractor employees "worked on the property every day for a party
that had both a contractual and a close working relationship with
NYNY" 236 Thus, the NYNY hotel was their workplace, and as the Board
noted, the Supreme Court has found that "the workplace is the 'one place
where employees clearly share common interests and where they
traditionally seek to persuade fellow workers in matters affecting their
union organizational life and other matters related to their status as
employees."' 237 For these reasons, and after discussing again at length
how the employees were exercising their own Section 7 rights to seek
support to form a union, the Board summed up the "employee rights" side
of the balance by stating, "[W]e find that the statutorily-recognized
interests of the Ark employees, as implicated here, are much more closely
aligned to those of NYNY's own employees (who, under our law, would
have been entitled to the access sought) than they are to the interests of
238
the union organizers at issue in Lechmere and Babcock & Wilcox."
The Board next considered the "property owner right" side of the
balance, recognizing that "there is no question that-countervailing
considerations of Federal labor law aside-NYNY, as the property owner,
had a right to exclude the Ark employees," 2 39 and adding, similarly to
what the Supreme Court in 2021 stated in Cedar Point Nursery,240 that
"'one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right to
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 914 (quoting Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 574 (1978)).
id. at 915-16.
id. at 916.

240. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the similar statement in Cedar Point
Nursery).
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exclude others.'"2 4 1 The Board in this part of the decision also indicated,
again as the Supreme Court later did in Cedar Point Nursery, that the
242
source and definition of the property owner's rights were in state law.
The Board added that, perhaps with a property rights as its source,
"NYNY also has a legitimate interest in preventing interference with the
use of its property." 243 The Board found that, in terms of the "production
and discipline" referenced in Republic Aviation, the ALJs had found after
a hearing and review of the record, and the Board concurred, that the
subcontractor employees' handbilling had not interfered with discipline
and never impaired "the ability of customers to enter, leave, or fully use
the facility or the ability of Ark or NYNY employees to perform their
work, and it was not a violation of any rule that NYNY attempts to defend
4
as necessary to ensure operations or discipline." 24
The Board realized that this so far satisfied the test only for an
employer's own employees, so it went on to consider and weigh the
difference between a property owner's employees and the subcontractor
employees who work on its property. The Board conceded that, unlike
with off-duty and off-site employees, the property owner might not be
able to control and discipline the subcontractors' employees as directly as
it did its own.245 But the Board further found that the employer did have
more control over such employees than it did over nonemployee union
organizers, because it could exercise such control through its relationship
and contract with their employer, the subcontractor. 246 The Board noted
that "NYNY was free to negotiate contractual terms with Ark sufficient
to protect its interests in relation to Ark's employees" and that in fact it
had done so as their contract "require[d] Ark to make . . . reasonable
efforts to ensure . . . employees abide by any reasonable rules and
regulations as [NY NY] may, from time to time, reasonably adopt for the
safety, care and cleanliness of [Ark's premises], or the Hotel or for the
preservation of good order thereon or to assure the operation of a first-

241. See NYNY, 356 N.L.R.B. at 916 (quoting PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74, 82 (1980)).
242. Compare id. (referring to "state property law" and to NYNY's "state law property right to
exclude," while also referencing "the well-established principle that state law property rights
sometimes must yield to the imperatives of Federal labor law" with Cedar Point Nursery, 141 S. Ct.
2063, 2075-76 (2021) ("As a general matter, it is true that the property rights protected by the Takings
Clause are creatures of state law."); see also supranote 21 discussing this part of Cedar Point Nursery.

243.
244.
245.
246.

See NYNY, 356 N.L.R.B. at 916.
See id.
See id
See id at 917.
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class resort hotel facility." 24 7 More specifically, the contract required
Ark's employees to be "subject to drug testing" (which Ark's employee
handbook also informed employees Ark could do) and that Ark employees
were prohibited from either wearing their uniforms outside the restaurant
or entering the bars inside the hotel). 24 8
The Board went on to observe that "NYNY and Ark share an
economic interest in ensuring that Ark employees do nothing that might
interfere with the operations" of the property owner. 24 9 The Board went
on to observe that "NYNY and Ark share an economic interest in ensuring
that Ark employees do nothing that might interfere with the operations"
of the property owner. 2 50 The Board next explained that based on its "long
and extensive experience with contractual relationships between
employer/contractors and property owners," it found that "such a
relationship ordinarily permits the property owner to quickly and
effectively intervene, both through the employer and directly, to prevent
any inappropriate conduct by the employer's employees on the owner's
Going into more detail, the Board described how
property." 25 1
"[p]roperty owners often give directions to employees of contractors
through the contractors' onsite managers and supervisors" which meant
contractor employees are subject not only to direction and discipline from
what their employer's supervisors witness or have reported to them, but
also direction and discipline the property owner's agents direct those
supervisors to take, and contractor employees also must comply when
"property owners themselves often direct contractors' employees without
the mediation of the contractor/employer's agents." 252
The Board next explained that property owners can impose control
in even more permanent ways: they can "direct contractors to remove
employees from the premises and not permit them to return." 253 In sum,
the Board concluded that "property owners ordinarily are able to protect
their property and operational interests, in relation to employees of
contractors working on their premises," without having to exclude such
employees as trespassers. 254 The Board pointed out again that this was

247. See id.
248. See id. (citing its prior decision in New York New York Hotel, LLC, 334 N.L.R.B. 762,
767-768 n.8 (2001)).
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See id at 917-18.
253. See id at 918.
254. See id.
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very different than the situation with nonemployee organizers employed
by a union. 25 5
Several months after its decision in NYNY, the Board applied its
NYNY standard in Simon DeBartolo Group (hereinafter "Simon"). 256 The
Board in that decision found that the respondent mall owner violated
NLRA Section 8(a)(1) by denying access to two of its mall parking lots
and outside sidewalks to employees who worked at each mall for a
maintenance subcontractor and were giving flyers to customers to seek
support for their effort to unionize. The Board majority found that these
employee handbillers met its NYNY standard because these off-duty
maintenance employees "were regularly employed on Simon's property
in work integral to Simon's business" and engaged in organizational
handbilling of mall customers "in exterior, nonworking areas open to the
public." 257 Responding to the contention of dissenting Member Brian
Hayes (no relation to the author) that these maintenance employees failed
the NYNY test because they did not work "exclusively" at the mall they
handbilled, 2 58 the Board majority reasoned that given the "physically
enormous" size of each of the malls and the resulting time if would take
to clean each mall, "we find it is more likely than not that the janitors'
work at the malls is not so fleeting or occasional as to take this case outside
the holding in NYNY" and "[t]o require that they work 'exclusively' at
the mall, as our colleague would do, is too strict a standard." 259 The Board
majorityadded, "The mall is the janitors' regular workplace whether they
also work at a different location on weekends (or even less frequently) or
not." 26 0
Having found that the off-duty employees' handbilling met the test
to be protected, the Simon Board turned to whether the mall owner had
met its burden under the NYNY standard of showing that the employees'
activity "significantly interfere[d]" with the mall owner's use of the mall
property and/or that denying access was "justified by another legitimate
business reason. "'261 The respondent, Simon, argued in the alternative,
arguing both that it need not show "actual disruption," but also that
"[c]ommon sense" supported the inference that such disruption existed,

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
(2011)).

See id.
Simon DeBartolo Grp., 357 N.L.R.B 1887, 1887 (2011).
See id. at 1888.
See id. at 1892 (Hayes, Member, dissenting).
See id. at 1888 n.8.

Id.
See id. at 1889 (quoting New York, New York Hotel & Casino, 356 N.L.R.B. 907, 918-19
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given the record facts that the handbills alleged "cockroaches in the food
court" and "the ability of shoppers and the employees of other tenants to
come and go from the facility free from harassment or nuisance would be
disrupted to some extent by handbillers standing in front of entrance
doors." 26 2
The Board rejected Simon's justifications, in large part based on the
reasoning that the concerns Simon expressed about its subcontractor
employees "could equally be expressed about its own employees'
comparable activity" if such employees chose to engage in it, because "the
law is clear that Simon's employees have a right to engage in such activity
on mall property and thus, under NYNY, so do [the maintenance
contractor's] employees." 263 The Board further found that Simon failed
to show that its "blanket prohibition" on contractor employees' access to
the handbill was needed to avert a "'heightened risk of interference,"' as
required by NYNY, "of concerns for safety, but based on the facts that
"the sidewalk and hallways in which the handbilling occurred were at
least 18 feet wide," the court held that the Board's findings that the
handbilling was safe and did not interfere with passing pedestrians were
"reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." 26 In a separate
concurrence, D.C. Circuit Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson discussed
extensively the same explanations and reasons from the Board's NYNY
decision that were discussed earlier in this article, 26 5 and concluded by
stating, "Given the Board's findings-supported by substantial
evidence-that the Ark employees were "'communicat[ing] concerning
their own terms and conditions of employment in and around their own
workplace,' 2 66 she could find the Board's balance of employee rights
versus property rights "'rational and consistent' with the NLRA" as
interpreted by the Supreme Court."267
Seven years after this D.C. Circuit decision, in August 2019, the
Board attempted to overrule both NYNY and Simon DeBartolo Group and
reduced the access rights of contractor employees in Bexar County
PerformingArts Foundation.268 In that decision the Board adopted the
following new multi-part standard for access of contractor employees to

262.
263.
264.
265.

See
See
See
See

id. (quoting without citation the Brief of Respondent Simon to the NLRB).
id. (emphasis added).

&

New York-New York, LLC v. NLRB, 676 F. 3d 193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
id. at 197-200 (LeCraft Henderson, J, concurring).
266. See id. at 199 (LeCraft Henderson, J, concurring) (quoting New York, New York Hotel
Casino, 356 N.L.R.B. 907, 919 (2011)).
267. See id. at 200.
268. Bexar Cnty. Performing Arts Ctr. Found., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 46, slip op. at 1 (2019).
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property not owned by their employer: (1) "only contractor employees
who work regularly and exclusively" on the property in question are
permitted to access the property to engage in Section 7-protected activity;
(2) contractor employees cannot work "regularly" on an owner's property
unless that contractor "regularly conducts business or performs services
there," 269 and (3) even when 1 and 2 are met, a property owner does not
have to allow access if the contractor employees have "a reasonable
alternative nontrespassory means to convey their Section 7 message." 270
About two years later, on August 31, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit found that the Board's application of its new test was
"arbitrary" and remanded the case to the Board to either "proceed with a
version of the test it announced and sought to apply in this case or to
develop a new test altogether."27 1
Both the Board and the D.C. Circuit considered facts of a case in
which contractor employees represented by the Musicians union engaged
in leafleting in February 2017 outside the Tobin Center for the Performing
72
Arts, prior to four weekend performances of the ballet Sleeping Beauty.2
They leafleted to protest Ballet San Antonio's use of recorded music,
rather than symphony musicians, for those performances, which would
deprive the musicians of working hours. 273 Each leaflet stated, "[y]ou
will not hear a live orchestra performing with the professional dancers of
Ballet San Antonio. Instead, Ballet San Antonio will waste the world
class acoustics of the Tobin Center by playing a recording ... You've paid
full price for half of the product. San Antonio deserves better! DEMAND
LIVE MUSIC!" 274 On the evening of February 17, prior to the first
performance of the ballet, event staff of the Tobin Center and the property
on which the musicians were leafleting, the Bexar County Performing
Arts Foundation, along with San Antonio police officers summoned by
the landowner, told the leafleters that they could not leaflet anywhere on
the Foundation's property, including sidewalks, and would have to
27 6
relocate to leaflet.2 7' The leafleters complied.
The D.C. Circuit in its decision observed that the Board, in applying
the prong that the musicians had not worked "regularly and exclusively"
269.
270.
271.
2021).
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

See id. at 3.
Id.
See Local 23, Am. Fed'n of Musicians v. NLRB., 12 F.4th 778, 781-82, 788 (D.C. Cir
See Bexar Cnty., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 46, slip op. at 4; Local 23, 12 F.4th at 780-81.
See Bexar Cnty., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 46, slip op. at 4; Local 23, 12 F.4th at 780-81.
See Bexar Cnty., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 46, slip op. at 4 (quoting the leaflet used).
See id.; Local 23, 12 F.4th at 780-81.
See Bexar Cnty., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 46, slip op. at 4; Local 23, 12 F.4th at 780-81.
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at the Tobin Center, had relied on the fact that they played there "only"
twenty-two weeks during the year. 277 After reasoning that "[t]he essential
measure of regularity under [the Board's] approach is thefrequency of the
work," the D.C. Circuit observed that the Board has also found that an
employee's access to property once a week satisfied "regularly." 278 The
D.C. Circuit then explained that "back-of-the-envelope arithmetic
confirms that working once a week (1/7) cannot count as regular presence
if working 22 weeks of the year (22/52) does not." 2 79 The D.C. Circuit
therefore concluded that the Board's decision, under its own
characterization of "regularly", was "internally inconsistent, and as a
result, arbitrary." 280
When the Board had applied the third prong of its new test for
contractor employee access, the Board additionally found that the
musicians had non-trespassory means of communicating with their target
audience, for which the Board relied on the fact that the musicians after
being told to relocate went across the street where they were able to
distribute hundreds of leaflets. 2 81 However, the Board in its decision also
made clear that the alternative need not be so easy or relatively
inexpensive, as it also identified as examples of "alternatives" the
Lechmere-related means of newspaper, TV, radio, and billboards, 2 82 as
well as mailings and websites. 283
The D.C Circuit also questioned that Board's application of this
prong. 284 The court found, based on the Board's language, the property
owner must bear the burden of proof on alternative means of
communication.28s The court went on to explain that this must be so
because otherwise there would be no difference between the access rights
of contractor employees-even those who are "regularly and exclusively"
on the property-and nonemployee union organizers as defined by the
U.S. Supreme Court's Lechmere decision. 2 86 The D.C. Circuit further
reasoned that without that "burden shift," the Board's new test would be
"incoherent" because contractor employees who "[work] regularly and

277. See Local 23, 12 F.4th at 783 (quoting Bexar Cnty., 368 N.LR.B. No. 46 at 3).
278. Id. at 783-84.
279. Id. at 784.
280. Id.
281. See Bexar Cnty., 368 N.LR.B. No. 46, slip op. at 4, 11.
282. See id. at 9, n.71, n.72 (citing Lechmere v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540 (1992) and Oakland
Mall (Oakland II), 316 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1163-64 (1995)).
283. See id. at 12 n.85.
284. See Local 23, Am. Fed'n of Musicians v. NLRB., 12 F.4th 778, 786 (D.C. Cir 2021).
285. Id.
286.

See id.; supra Part II.B. (discussing the Lechmere decision in detail).
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287
The
exclusively on the property would gain nothing from doing so."
D.C. Circuit next found that the Board never applied such "burden
shifting" in its decision because it had adopted the new test without giving
the employer and union parties an opportunity to present evidence in the
record on the "alternative means of communication" issue, a Board choice
the court deemed to be "arbitrary." 288 More specifically, the court
majority pointed out that the union had never been given the chance to
present evidence and arguments on whether having to leaflet across the
street, which union agents resorted to after being excluded from Tobin
Center property, was a "reasonably effective alternative" based on such
factors as "the distance from the public sidewalks to the theater entrances
28 9
and the proportion of theater patrons who used the sidewalks."
In this case D.C. Circuit Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson wrote a
separate concurring opinion, perhaps seeking to expand on the
requirements for contract employee access she had identified in her
290
concurring opinion in the 2012 New York-New York, LLC decision.
Judge LeCraft Henderson concluded her brief concurrence by stating that
if the Board had "adequately explained and applied the 'exclusivity' and
'alternative means' prongs of its new framework, I believe we would have
1
been obliged to affirm its decision." 2 9
The Bexar County case remains pending on remand at the Board, and
in January 2022 the current Board invited parties in the case to submit
statements of position, by February 1, regarding the issues raised by the
remand. 2 92 One issue the Board should consider on remand and/or in other
cases is how the former Board, in its 2019 decision, repeatedly referred to
2 93
the musicians' employer, the San Antonio Symphony, as a "licensee."
Although it might be arguable whether this affected the Board majority's
reasoning and conclusion, using that term to refer to the symphony wasas will be explained shortly-probably erroneous. 2 94 That this likely did
affect the Board's reasoning is indicated by the Board's statements on the
first page of its 2019 decision that "This case ... involves a different
category of workers: off-duty employees of a licensee employer who are
neither employees of the property owner nor, like nonemployees, utter

287.
288.
289.

See Local 23, 12 F.4th at 786.
See id. at 786-87
See id. at 787.

290.

See supra notes 265-67 & accompanying text (discussing J. LeCraft Henderson's

concurring opinion in New York-New York, LLC v. NLRB, 676 F. 3d 193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
291. See Local 23, 12 F.4th at 788 (LeCraft Henderson, J., concurring).
292. ES Office Letter, Local 23, 12 F.4th 778 (No. 16-CA-193696).
293. Id. at 1.
294. See infra Part HLB.
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strangers to the owner's property. For purposes of an analysis under the
Act, a licensee is indistinguishable from an onsite contractor." 295 On the
decision's second page the Board asserted, "[u]nder the terms of use
agreements, each of these companies has a licensor-licensee relationship
with the Respondent." 29 6
However, the referenced agreement did not use that terminology, at
least with regard to the musicians' employer the San Antonio
Symphony. 297 Moreover, under Texas law a "licensee" is defined as one
on the property for their own benefit and not the owner's, but with the
owner's consent, such as a social guest. 298 Surely the presence of the San
Antonio Symphony benefited the Tobin Center for the Performing Arts
when such performances were that Center's raison d'etre, which would
make the Symphony an "invitee" under Texas property law.2 99 "Onsite
contractors" are almost always invitees because the property owner not
only consents to their presence but invites them there to perform a service
or carry out an activity that benefits that property owner. 300
Consequently, to be consistent with property law, the Board should have
found that the musicians were employees of an invitee, not of a
licensee. 30 1
The Board majority announced it was adopting the new standard so
as to exercise its discretion in a way to be "more consistent with the
Supreme Court precedent.described above," which of course meant the
Lechmere and Babcock & Wilcox decisions on access by nonemployee
union organizers. 302 Thus the Board applied a "nonemployee organizer"
analysis and test to contractor employees who spent at least twenty-two
weeks of a calendar year, out of the thirty weeks per year they worked as
musicians, working at the location. 303 This led to denial of any right of
access for the musicians in the case, and if the test continues to be
followed by the Board or any court would result in greatly reduced access
295.
296.

See Bexar Cnty., 368 N.L.R.B No. 46, slip op. at 1.
See id. at 3

297.

See Use Agreement Between the San Antonio Symphony and The Tobin Center, in Joint

Appendix for Am. Fed'n of Musicians Local 23 v. NLRB, No. 20-1010 (D.C. Cir.), at JA 199-204,
https://www.nlrb.gov/case/16-CA-193636.
298. See generally Susan L. Thomas and Edward K. Esping, 59 Tex. Jur. 3d Premises Liability
§25 (3rd ed. 2010 Supp. 2021).
299. See id.
300. See id. ("The test for determining invitee status ... is whether the claimants had present
business relations with the defendants at the time of injury that made their presence of mutual

benefit.").
301. See generally id.
302. See Bexar Cnty., 368 N.L.R.B No. 46, slip op. at 6.
303. See id.
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for almost all contractor employees in the future.3 04 This will be
especially harmful to employees who work only for contractors who in
turn perform services on property they do not own and usually do not
possess. 30 5 Therefore it will include tens of millions of employees
working in fields such as construction, engineering, building maintenance
and cleaning, landscaping, other services to hotels and resorts and
306
governments at all levels, and more, and more every year.
This point was also made in Bexar County Performing Arts
Foundationby then-Member, now Chairman McFerran in her dissenting
opinion when she faulted the majority for "dramatically scal[ing] back
labor-law rights for a large segment of American workers ... employees
who work regularly on property that does not belong to their
employer." 307 Dissenting Member McFerran contended that the Board
majority's reasons for overruling the Board's NYNYdecision and standard
for access of contractor employees were "arbitrary" and in conflict with
NLRA Section 7 and Supreme Court precedents interpreting that
statute. 308 For example, she found that "[t]here is simply no rational,
much less statutory, basis for limiting Section 7 access rights to only those
employees who are employed exclusively on the property owner's
property-and categorically denying access to all employees who also
work somewhere else, even if they are regularly employed on the owner's
property." 309 In her reasoning, she related this to the "balancing" between
employee and property owner rights/interests that the Supreme Court has
long applied to property access. 310
Regarding the "employee" side, she pointed out that the Supreme
Court has recognized that the workplace of employees "is the 'one place
where employees clearly share common interests and where they
traditionally seek to persuade fellow workers in matters affecting their
union organizational life and other matters related to their status as
employees."' 3 11 In addition, that this was "no less true" when employees

304. See id at 15.
305. See id.
306. See generally David weil, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR
MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (Harvard Univ. Press 2014).

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

See Bexar Cnty., 368 N.L.R.B No. 46, slip op. at 15 (McFerran, Member, dissenting).
See id at 19.
See id. at 21 (emphasis added).
See id. at 19-20.
See id at 22 (quoting Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 574 (1978)). The Supreme

Court's quoted point about persuading fellow workers would apply directly to why contractor
employees sought access in the NYNY case. See supra notes 225-37 and accompanying text

(discussing the facts of the Board's NYNY decision).
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sought to communicate with customers and other "present at the
workplace" because "[t]hatis precisely where employees and [customers]
intersect." 3 12 Regarding these contractor employee rights, Member
McFerran also repeatedly emphasized that contractor employees are
distinguishable from the nonemployee organizers whose "derivative"
Section 7 rights were at issue in Babcock & Wilcox and in Lechmere
because contractor employees are seeking to exercise their own Section 7
rights to communicate with employees (often including co-workers)
and/or customers or members of the public entering or also on the
property. 3 13 Member McFerran made clear that such "direct" Section 7
rights should be treated as stronger than and having more weight in the
balance than the "derivative" union organizer rights the Bexar County
majority treated as equivalent with contractor employee rights. 3 14
Turning to the weight on the property owner's side of the balance,
Member McFerran found that the weight for property owners for access
sought by contractor employees was "the same, regardless of whether
contractor employees also work somewhere else," which supported
finding the "exclusivity" requirement to be arbitrary.3"
In addition,
Member McFerran observed that any employees who work "regularly" at
a location-whether contractor employees or the property owner's own-have Section 7 rights the property owner should legally expect could be
used.3 16 By treating contractor employees differently from a property
owner's employees, and applying to the former the same rules that are
applied to nonemployee organizers, the majority-Member McFerran
charged-was treating "the owner's mere objection to the employees'
presence" as being sufficient to outweigh the employees' Section 7 rights
and thereby "allow[ing] employees' rights under the Act to be trumped by
the owner's bare property right to exclude unwanted persons." 317
Member McFerran added, "[t]he majority offers no reasonable
justification for this drastic outcome," which further supported her
conclusion that the majority's test was arbitrary. 3 18

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

See Bexor Cnty., 368 N.L.R.B No. 46, slip op. at 22 (emphasis in original).
See id. at 16, 20, 22.
See id. at 2.
See id. at 22.
See id. at 2, 14.
See id at 23.
See id.
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C. Employees Engaging in Section 7-ProtectedActivity Should
Have Access to Non-Working Areas of Property Where They
Work, or Where their EmployerPerforms Work
Employees should have a right of access to engage in Section 7covered communications with co-workers or others, when and where the
speaker and listener are on non-working time, where their employer
operates, and where one or more co-workers perform work. Because the
access is for Section 7-related communication, it will relate to the terms
and conditions of the communicators' employment and/or a union seeking
to positively affect such terms and conditions. 3 19
The U.S. Supreme Court indicated this should be so within ten years
of the NLRA's enactment when, in its 1945 Republic Aviation decision,
it upheld the NLRB's rule that "it [is] not within the province of an
employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation
by an employee outside of working hours, although on company
property" 32 0 It seems worth noting that the U.S. Supreme Court said this
on April 23, 1945 about employee rights in a military aircraft factory
where the employer and workers were producing planes and other
materials during World War II.321 Any property owner who wants to
restrict the Section 7-protected activities of its employees, or any
employees who perform work for it, should perhaps be asked to compare
the importance and magnitude of the property rights and interests it's
defending against the rights and interests Republic Aviation could argue
322
it was serving when it limited employee solicitation.
Thirty-three years after Republic Aviation, in Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB, 323 the Supreme Court again considered the rights of off-duty
324
and
employees "already rightfully on the employer's property"
therefore the employer's "reliance on its property right is largely
misplaced." 325 In Eastex, the Court found that it was really the
employer's management interests that were at stake, 326 but it added that
the "only cognizable property right in this respect is in preventing

319.
320.
Co. Inc.,
321.

See generally Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565-67 (1978).
See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 802 (1945) (quoting Peyton Packing
49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1944)).
See id. at 793-95 (providing the date of the decision and describing what Republic Aviation

and its employees were doing at the time the employer barred solicitation).

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

See Eastex, Inc., 437 U.S. at 573.
See id. at 556.
See id. at 573 (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507, 521-522, n.10 (1976)).
See id. at 572-73.
See id. at 573.
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employees from bringing literature onto its property and distributing it
there-not in choosing which distributions protected by Section 7 it
wishes to suppress." 327 Ultimately the Court in Eastex decided that the
property rights did not outweigh the off-duty employees Section 7
rights.3 28 To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled to the contrary.
Neither has the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, to which all
NLRB decisions can be appealed. 329
Given that background, employees-including off-duty and off-site
employees-should at least retain the rights of access they now possess to
engage in solicitation, distribution and other Section 7-protected activity
on property in which their employer is a landowner. 330 Employees of
subcontractors-who usually work on property in which their employer
is not a landowner-should also have rights of access greater than those
of nonemployee union organizers and representatives, even though the
Board's 2019 decision in Bexar County disagreed. 33 1 In the 1990s and
2000s the Board held that subcontractor employees who worked
"regularly and exclusively" on the property of the landowner, had the
same access rights as the landowner's own employees. 332 In 2011, as
discussed earlier, the Board replaced this approach with the test it
established in New York New York Hotel & Casino.333 For subcontractor
employees, the Board should return to one of those two approaches and
the federal courts should reject any challenges to the standard the Board
chooses.
Then-Member McFerran rightly noted in her dissent in Bexar County
that the Board majority's reduction of the rights of access of subcontractor
employees to only the extent of nonemployee organizers in effect stripped
"a large segment of American workers" of any rights of access. 334 For

327. See id. This point has obvious relevance to access to property to engage in labor protest
rather than union organizing, and possibly also to the non-discrimination rule for access to property.

328.
329.

See id. at 572-73, 575-76.
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(f) (West 2018) (stating that any person aggrieved by an order from

the NLRB can file an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia).

330. See, e.g., ITT Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 413 F.3d 64, 76 (U.S. App. D.C. 2005); S. Bakeries,
LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 1-2 (2019); Tri-County Med. Ctr., 222 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1089-90.
331. Bexar Cnty. Performing Arts Ctr. Found., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 46, slip op. at 6 (2019).
332. Id.; see, e.g., Downtown Hartford YMCA, 349 N.L.R.B. 960, 972 (2007); Gayfers Dep't
Store, 324 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1250 n.2, 1251 (1997); S. Serv., 300 N.L.R.B. 1154, 1155 (1990),
enforced, 954 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1992). In these three decisions the Board referred to the
subcontractor employees as working "regularly and exclusively" on the property of the landowner
who sought to exclude them, but none of these decisions involved subcontractor employees who did

not do so.
333. N.Y. N.Y. Hotel & Casino, 356 N.L.R.B. 907, 918-19 (2011).
334. See Bexar Cnty., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 46, slip op. at 14-15.
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example, according to the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor
Statistics, reliance on subcontractors and their employees is nearly
335
universal for the millions of employees in the construction industry.
That more than ten million, or even twenty million, employees will also
be affected is shown by the Bureau of Labor Statistics' report on
"contingent employment," which found that over 20.5 million workers, or
nearly 14% of the total U.S. workforce, were not directly employed by the
enterprise for whom they were performing work. 336 For now the number
of "subcontractor employees" seems likely to continue to grow. 337 Thus,
how their federal labor law rights are treated is of vital importance to
millions of employees and will almost certainly increase in importance in
the near future. 33 8

The D.C. Circuit in its "second" ITT Industries decision recognized
the "inherent tension ... between an employer's property rights and the
Section 7 rights of its employees" 339 but the court further held that this
3 40
tension "cannot be resolved merely by reference to the law of trespass."
It bears repeating that the law on trespass to property, like all property
law, is usually governed by state law. 341 For subcontractor employees, as
for all employees who have access to at least outdoor non-working areas,
it is the employer on whose behalf they perform work who is seeking to
exclude them from the property. 342 One important aspect of that fact, as
the Board and the D.C. Circuit pointed out in ITT Industries and in NYNY
Hotel & Casino, is that (as with off-site employees who seek access) the
property owner could probably subject them to discipline for a valid
business reason, because whether based in the subcontractor-owner
contract or not, the subcontractor would likely comply with any lawful

335. See Measuring Productivity Growth in Construction, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS (Jan.
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2018/article/measuring-productivity-growth-in2018)
construction.htm.
336. See Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements Summary, U.S. BUREAU OF
LAB. STATS (June 7, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0.htm (using percentages of
workers with contingent jobs, independent contractors, on-call workers, temporary help agency
workers, and workers provided by contract firms).
337. See generally weil, supra note 306, at 192 (drawing on an example of a construction site
to state the proposition that the number of subcontractor employees will likely continue to grow).

338.
339.
Highland
340.
341.

Id. at 22, 209.
ITT Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 413 F.3d 64, 72 (U.S. App. D.C. 2005) (quoting Hillhaven
House, 336 N.L.R.B. 646, 649 (2001)).
Id.
See N.Y. N.Y. Hotel & Casino, 356 N.L.R.B. 907, 916, 921 (2011) (showing that all

property law is usually governed by state law).

342. Id. at 918.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol39/iss1/3

46

Hayes: Points about Cedar Point: What Labor Access Survives, and What Sh

2021]

POINTS ON CEDAR POINT: WHAT LABOR ACCESS SURVIVES

119

owner request to discipline the employee(s) or bar the employee(s) from
that owner's property. 34 3
In addition, as the U.S. Supreme Court said in Eastex (which thenMember McFerran relied on in her dissent in Bexar County) when access
is sought for organizing employees, the workplace is the "one place where
[employees] clearly share common interests and where they traditionally
seek to persuade fellow workers in matters affecting their union
organizational life and other matters related to their status as
employees." 344 This likely remains true among current employees, who
when they work outside their home probably prefer not to be bothered
with "work issues" while at home, and subcontractor employees and even
co-workers might be blocked from access to personal social media sites
of other employees. 345
The CedarPointNursery decision suggests another line of argument
favoring property access for contractor employees. 346 The Court held that
the Takings clause of the Fifth Amendment did not apply when the
government made "intrusion" by inspectors or others a "condition" of a
benefit for the property owner, including in return for a license, permit, or
desisting from exercising a police power.34 7 A property owner must
benefit in some way from having employees other than its own perform
work on its property, otherwise that property owner would not do so.34 8
For example, in Bexar County PerformingArts Foundationitself, the nonprofit Foundation itself understandably preferred to use professional
musicians already employed by the San Antonio Symphony rather than
expending the time, trouble and cost of hiring its own musicians to
perform at the Tobin Center. 349 That case involved an especially obvious
343. ITT Indus., Inc., 413 F.3d at 74-77 (discussing and accepting the Board's application of this
factor); NYNY, 356 NLRB at 917-19 (applying this factor); N.Y.N.Y., LLC, v. NLRB, 676 F.3d 193,
196, 196 n.2 (U.S. App. D.C. 2012) (accepting the Board's application of this factor).
344. Bexar Cnty. Performing Arts Ctr. Found., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 46, slip op. at 22 (2019)
(McFerran, Member, dissenting); Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 574 (1978) (quoting Gale
Prods., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1249 (1963)).
345. See generally Shelcy V. Joseph, Should You Let Your Coworkers Follow You on Social
Media?,
FORBES
(Feb.
19,
2020,
5:37
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/shelcyvjoseph/2020/02/19/should-you-let-your-coworkers-followyou-on-social-media/?sh=6cIb77481bf6 (discussing opinions on keeping social media profiles from
coworkers); see also Joe Robinson, The Science of Work Recovery: How to Leave Work Stress at
Work,
JOE
ROBINSON
OPTIMAL
PERFORMANCE
STRATEGIES,
https://www.worktolive.info/blog/science-of-work-recovery-how-to-leave-work-stress-at-work (last

visited Nov. 24, 2021).
346. See generallyCedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).
347. See id. at 2079.
348. See Bexar Cnty., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 46, slip op. at 25.
349. Id.
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and substantial benefit, but in every situation in which a property owner
uses employees other than its own to perform work on its property, the
property owner obtains a benefit. 350 A "condition" of that benefit could
and should be some acceptance of the Section 7 rights of the employees
who benefit the property owner with their work, including the right to be
on that owner's property to engage in solicitation and/or distribution to
further their own rights and/or interests, as the casino employees were
35 2
doing in NYNY351 and the musicians were doing in Bexar County.
In Cedar Point Nursery, the Court reasoned that the condition for a
an
permit or other benefit for a property owner should "bear[] ...
'essential nexus" and 'rough proportionality' to the impact of the
[owner's] proposed use of the property." 3 5 3 The work the contractor's
employees perform on the property (and sometimes, as in the NYNY case,
the work of other contractor employees working on that property)
establishes the "nexus" with the "use" of the property, a "use" largely
defined by, and certainly at least significantly contributed to, by the
contractor employees. 354 Also, the other factors the Board in NYNY
included in its test for contractor employee access strengthen the
connection with, and augment the "proportion" of, the contractor
employees' work and the property owner's "use" of the property: the work
is "integral" to the property owner's use of the property and the employees
work "regularly" on that property to further the property owner's use of
it.355

350.
351.

Id. at 26.
See N.Y. N.Y. Hotel & Casino, 356 N.L.R.B. 907, 914-15 (2011) (discussing that D.C.

Circuit in its NYNY decision observed that it had never distinguished, for access purposes, between
employees engaging in organizing activity and employees seeking to communicate with consumers
and members of the public).

352.

Bexar Cnty., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 46, slip op. at 4. As dissenting Member McFerran pointed

out in that decision, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that employees have a right to appeal to the

public for support. See id at 26 (McFerran, Member, dissenting) (citing Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 556 (1978)).
353. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2079 (2021) (quoting Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386, 391 (1994)).
354. See id; NYNY, 356 N.L.R.B. at 908, 910.
355. See Bexar Cnty., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 46, slip op. at 1, 2, 3, 5, 16 (discussing the "regular"
and "integral" work as part of the NYNYtest). In the 2019 Bexar County decision, the Board criticized
the 2011 NYNY and Simon DeBartolo decisions for dropping the factor that contractor employees
worked "exclusively" on the property at issue. Id at 2, 5. However, that fact that the contractor
employees might work at one or more other properties in addition to the "target" property to which
they seek access seems less relevant to the target property owner's "use" of the contractor employees
on that property, at least compared with whether the contractor employees "exclusively" work there.
See id at 3. So the Board's decision in Simon DeBartolo Group to drop a "work exclusively" factor
is sensible and consistent with the Cedar Point Nursery's discussion of "conditions" a property owner
should accept. Id. at 2, 5.
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The National Labor Relations Board actually used "condition"
reasoning for subcontractors employees, at least when they were
represented by a union, in CDK Contracting.3 56 The Board reasoned that
because the respondent controlled access to the jobsite, by virtue of hiring
subcontractors, the respondent "thereby 'necessarily submitted their own
property rights to whatever activity, lawful and protected by the Act,'
might be engaged in by union business agents in the performance of their
duties vis-a-vis these subcontractors" when expressly by contract or by
past practice have granted union business agents access to the site. 357 In
Wolgast Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit accepted
and applied this reasoning, and rejected the property owner's assertion
that Lechmere should be applied. 358 It's just a slight extension of this
reasoning to hold that any property owner who relies on subcontractor
employees to perform work for it should accept not only contractuallycreated rights, but also statutory Section 7-protected rights of employees
to communicate with other employees, and sometimes also consumers and
the general public. 359
The Court in the Cedar Point Nursery decision also said that a
property owner's "right to exclude" is a "fundamental element of the
property right." 360 But the adjective "fundamental" could be applied to
either side of the property vs. employee rights side of the balance the
Supreme Court established in 1956 in Babcock & Wilcox. 36 1 Persons
advocating more weight for the latter could accurately point out that the
source of the "employee rights" is federal law, including dozens of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, while the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently
held that the source of "property rights" is state law. 362 With Babcock
Wilcox and Lechmere, the U.S. Supreme Court did establish a federal
labor law basis for property rights, so the Constitution's "Supremacy

356. CDK Contracting Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 1117, 1122 (1992).
357. Id.
358. wolgast Corp. v. NLRB, 349 F.3d 250, 253, 255-57 (6th Cir. 2003).
359. See Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court Just Handed Down Disastrous News for Unions,
Vox (Jun. 23, 2021, 2:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/202 1/6/23/22547 182/supreme-court-unionbusting-cedar-point-hassid-john-roberts-takings-clause. And while the following is broader reasoning
applying the Cedar Point Nursery condition reasoning, it has some force, at least when applied to
federally protected rights: Ian Millhiser pointed out in Vox, "Nor is it clear why, if the government
can require restaurants to admit health inspectors as a condition of doing business, it can't also require
that restaurant to admit union organizers as a condition of employing workers." Id.

360. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2072 (2021) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U. S. 164, 179-180 (1979)).
361. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1955).
362. See generally Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 558 (1978); see Cedar Point Nursery v.
Hassid et al., 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2076 (2021).
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Clause" 3 63 does not require that federal Section 7 rights always trump
state property rights.
Property rights in one's residence are surely treasured and deserving
of protection, and commercial property rights-defined by state law-of
course also are protected by the U.S. Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 364 However, unless the "derivative" rights of a renter of
property, like for example the excluding employer did in Kroger,3 65 are
intrinsically more deserving of respect than "regularly" working on it, it
is difficult to comprehend why the former weigh more heavily in the 65year old Babcock & Wilcox balancing test than the Congressionallyestablished Section 7 rights of that employer's employees (or the
employees of a subcontractor it retains). The NLRA Section 7 rights of
all employees, recognized and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court since
the 1945 RepublicAviation decision, are deserving of considerable respect
and protection, at least if these rights are given the proper weight in the
As discussed above, using the
balance with property rights. 366
"condition" language of the Supreme Court's 2021 CedarPointNursery
367
decision would be one means by which to apply an appropriate balance.
And, of course, as the Supreme Court itself said in Republic Aviation,
employees of any kind can lose Section 7 protection if their exercise of
Section 7 rights interferes with production and discipline at the workplace
in question.368

This article discussed in Part I,369 and will again in the following Part
IV Sections A and B, 370 why the CedarPointNursery decision should not
be understood or interpreted to create a Fifth Amendment Takings clause
37 1
If the
source for the property rights recognized in federal labor law.
to
access
law-protected
labor
to
federal
Takings clause is applied
property, it should be applied in the way the Fifth Amendment's drafters
wrote it, meaning "compensation" to the property owner for the intrusion
and not near-absolute exclusion as is now applied under Lechmere for

shall be the supreme Law
363. See U.S. CONST., art VI ("[T]he Laws of the United States ...
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.")

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
See Kroger Ltd. P'ship 1, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 2 (2019).
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 795-96 (1945).
See supra Part ILIA; see Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid et al., 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2079 (2021).
See Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 803 n.10.

369.

See supraPart I.

370.
371.

See infra Part IV.A-B.
See infra Part IVA.
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nonemployee organizers or other union representatives. 372 The next Part
of the article will expand on this point and discuss the complications that
would likely be created if the Fifth Amendment Takings clause were
applied to employee and union access. 373 Those complications make it
undesirable as a policy matter, and likely even to most of the parties
involved, to use the Fifth Amendment Takings clause to transform federal
labor law.
IV. CEDAR POINTNURSERY: OPENING THE DOOR TO "PAY AS
{UNION} GOES?

A. Are NLRA "PropertyRights" Based in the Fifth Amendment?

&

To date, no Supreme Court majority has ever held that the
Constitution's Fifth Amendment is the source of the "property rights" that
are to be balanced against NLRA Section 7 rights of employees and the
"derivative" Section 7 rights of nonemployees. Even in 2021 in Cedar
Point Nursery, the Court majority said that in general the source of
property rights is "state law." 374 However, that raises the question why
such "state law" property rights are not preempted by the federal NLRA,
given the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause. 375 The Supreme Court
in its 1945 decision in Republic Aviation simply declared that the
property/Section 7 right existed, and said eleven years later in Babcock
Wilcox that the Section 7 rights were "granted" and the property rights
"preserved" by the "National Government." 37 6 And the Court's 1992
Lechmere decision relied on Babcock & Wilcox as defining the standard
to apply for the balance. 377
The Supreme Court Justice who so far has been clearest about
identifying the Fifth Amendment as the source of the "property right" to
be considered in NLRA cases is the late Chief Justice William

372. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540-41 (1992).
373. See infra Part Iv.C.
374. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2076 (2021).
375. See generally THE BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFS., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, THE BOARD,
THE COURTS, AND THE NLRA, CHAPTER 28 FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE REGULATION,
BLOOMBERG LAW § 28.I.A. (2020) (discussing how Congress has power over labor law through the
Commerce Clause but chooses to leave the sphere open for the states to regulate).

376. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 795-96 (1945) (declaring that a
section 7 right existed); see also NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1955) (finding
that property rights are preserved by the National Government and that Section 7 rights were granted).

See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 532-533 (1992) (applying the Babcock

&

377.

Wilcox standard to the cases circumstances).
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Rehnquist. 378 He did so when dissenting, while a Justice, in the 1978
Eastex decision. 379 The majority in that decision held that off-duty
employees had a right to distribute in nonworking areas of their workplace
a union newsletter, even though their employer had denied them
permission to do so. 380 Justice Rehnquist maintained that because the
employees had been denied permission by the employer/property owner
to engage in distribution, they were trespassers when they did so
anyway. 3 81 In his analysis he asserted that "[in] its earliest cases
construing the National Labor Relations Act the Court has recognized the
weight of an employer's property rights, rights which are explicitly
protected from federal interference by the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution."382 By contrast, the Eastex Court majority found that
because the employees distributing newsletters were "already rightfully
on the employer's property" that therefore "in the context of this case it is
the employer's management interests rather than its property interests that
primarily are implicated." 3 83 And the late Justice Byron White in a
concurrence also opined that the employer's property rights were likely
violated but, like the Supreme Court majorities in Republic Aviation,
Babcock & Wilcox, and Lechmere, Justice White did not identify any
source for the property right but instead just stated, "[o]wnership of
384
property normally confers the right to control the use of that property."
In his Cedar Point Nursery concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh
arguably joined Justice Rehnquist in basing NLRA "property rights" in
386
the Fifth Amendment, but more obliquely. 38 5 As discussed earlier,
Justice Kavanagh departed from the majority, which rejected Babcock
Wilcox as a basis for its ruling, and maintained that Babcock & Wilcox's
378.

See generally Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 580 (1978) (dissenting and finding that

property rights are protected from the federal government's interference by the 5th amendment of the
Constitution and that the 5' amendment should be considered the source of property rights in NLRA

cases).
379. Id.
380. Id. at 564. The employer's main argument in its appeal to the Supreme Court was that
distributing the newsletter was not covered by Section 7 because it encouraged employees to "support
workers" on issues like minimum wage, which did not involve "self-organization" and were not
relevant in the distributors' workplace where they earned more than minimum wage. Id. at 563, 567
n. 17. The Supreme Court majority found these issues were covered by Section 7's phrases "concerted
activity" and "mutual aid or protection." Id. at 563-65.

381. See id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
382. Id. (emphasis added).
383. Id. at 573 (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507, 521-522, n.10 (1976)).
384. See id at 579 (White, J., concurring).
385. See Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2080 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J,
concurring).

386.

See supra Section II.A.
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holdings on "property rights" strongly supported the CedarPointNursery
majority's conclusion that the California regulation granting union
organizers access to growers' property without compensating the growers
violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.3 8 7
Among the few dozen briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court in Cedar
PointsNursery, only the amicus brief of the Liberty Justice Center argued
that NLRA property rights were based on the Fifth Amendment. 3 88 That
group did so by citing the U.S. Supreme Court's 1972 CentralHardware
v. NLRB decision for the proposition that "it [the Supreme Court] has
based its requirement that labor rights accommodate private property
rights in the fundamental guarantees of our founding documents, since it
would 'constitute an unwarranted infringement of long-settled rights of
private property protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' to
subordinate basic rights to property in the name of labor peace." 389
Notwithstanding the Liberty Justice Center's apparent assertion
otherwise, Central Hardware does not really support the Fifth
Amendment as the source of 2 1St century NLRA rights, because the "labor
rights" in that case were not based on NLRA Section 7 but rather on the
"state action" of the U.S. Supreme Court itself finding a "constitutional"
basis for access to property in "public property devoted to public use" in
Amalgamated FoodEmployees v. Logan Valley Plaza,390 a decision that,
as even the Liberty Justice Center argued in its CedarPointNursery brief,
391 was overruled in CentralHardware.392 It was that now-restricted and
maybe defunct constitutional right of access for labor protest, not NLRA
rights, that the Supreme Court in Central Hardware found could
"infringe" the Fifth Amendment rights of property owners. 393 Moreover,
the Court in CentralHardwarein the same quoted language also referred
to "Fourteenth Amendment" rights that could be infringed by the
constitutional right of access, which could mean the Court recognized that
property rights were based on state law. 394 Therefore, CentralHardware

387.
388.
at *2.

See id.
Brief of the Amicus Curiae Liberty Justice Center in Support of Petitioners, supra note 10

389. See id. at *4 (quoting Cent. Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972)).
390. See Cent. Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972) (referencing Amalgamated
Food Emp. Union Loc. 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 88 S. Ct. 1601 (1968)).
391. See Brief of the Amicus Curiae Liberty Justice Center in Support of Petitioners, supranote
10, at *5.

392.
393.
394.

Cent. HardwareCo., 407 U.S. at 547-48.
Id. at 547.
Id.
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also did not settle whether "property rights" in NLRA cases are grounded
in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. 39 5
To find that NLRA access rights are grounded in the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause, a court would have to disregard not only the
above-discussed Supreme Court NLRA decisions, but also past Takings
decisions in which the Supreme Court stated explicitly that the
Constitution is not the source of property rights or interests (such as the
right to exclude). 396 A strong example is Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
in which the Court declared it must be "mindful of the basic axiom that
'[p]roperty interests ... are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law."' 39 7 The CedarPoint Nursery majority was "mindful" in that way
because, as discussed earlier, it took the time and trouble to observe that
were it not for the California regulation on access to agricultural property,
California law would allow growers to exclude union organizers as
trespassers.39 8
B. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause's "Public Use"
Requirement
If the U.S. Supreme Court or any federal court were to flout stare
decisis and decades of understanding of U.S. property law and rule that
the "property rights" in NLRA cases are based on the Fifth Amendment
Takings clause, that would make relevant the "public use" provisions of
the Takings clause. 399 In the Cedar Point Nursery case, the brief
supporting the petitioners by amicus Americans for Prosperity Foundation
contended that the California regulation granting organizers access to
property was an example of "the transfer of private property to another
private party-not for public use-but for private use in a manner that

395.
396.

See id.
See generally id.; see generally Kick v. Twp of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2166 (2019) ("But

in the 1870s, as state courts began to recognize implied rights of action for damages under the state
equivalents of the Takings Clause, they declined to grant injunctions because property owners had an
adequate remedy at law. Congress enabled property owners to obtain compensation for takings by the
Federal Government when it passed the Tucker Act in 1887, and this Court subsequently joined the
state courts in holding that the compensation remedy is required by the Takings Clause itself").

397. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (quoting Webb's Fabulous
Pharm's, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)).
398. See Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (2015); Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,
141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).
399.

See CedarPointNursery, 141 $. Ct. at 2063.
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purportedly may serve a public purpose." 40 0 This brief went on to imply
that the Court should overrule precedents such as its 2015 decision in
Horne40 1 and 2005 decision in Kelo402 and follow the separate opinions
of Justice Clarence Thomas which called for barring, with or without
compensation, any "taking" of private property for any purpose other than
giving the public use of the property. 403
Adopting Justice Thomas' opinion would mean that employee or
nonemployee access rights under the NLRA are not for a "public use" and
would require overruling not only the precedents mentioned in the prior
paragraph, and the NLRA access precedents to date (including the
Lechmere opinion written by Justice Thomas), but U.S. Supreme Court
precedents dating back to the 1940s. 4 04 In 1946 the Court held that with
regard to federal law (like the NLRA), "[w]e think that it is the function
of Congress to decide what type of taking is for a public use." 405 In 1992
the Court further explained, "[w]e have held that the public use
requirement of the Takings Clause is coterminous with the regulatory
power, and that the Court will not strike down a condemnation on the basis
as the taking 'is rationally related to a
that it lacks a public use so long
406
conceivable public purpose."'
In sum, neither the Supreme Court nor any other federal court could
hold that NLRA rights of access to property are not for a "public use"
without upending the relationship between those courts and Congress, and
settled expectations of a major portion of the United States population
regarding that relationship. 407
C. The Futurefor "Compensated Takings "for Union Access?
As was just discussed, there should be no question that NLRA rights
of access meet the "public use" requirement for the Takings clause. 4 08
400. Brief for Americans for Prosperity Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
supra note 10, at 14-15.

401.
402.

See Horne v. Dep't. of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (2015).
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90, 507-11 (2005).

403. See Brief for Americans for Prosperity Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
supra note 10, at 17-19.

404.

See generally U.S. ex rel. Tenn. valley Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1946)

(discussing that it is the function of Congress to decide what type of taking is for a public use, not the
Supreme Court).

405. Id.
406. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422 (1992) (quoting
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff 467 U.S. 229, 240-241 (1984)).
407.
408.

See generally Echeverria, supra note 80, at 767-68.
See supraPart IV.B.
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Consequently, what would remain to be decided if such access were
(wrongfully) deemed to be a Taking covered by the Fifth Amendment is
how the amount of compensation for the Taking would be determined and
how much the compensation would be. 409 That is so because, as the U.S.
Supreme Court has repeatedly held regarding the Fifth Amendment, "[a]s
its text makes plain, the Takings Clause 'does not prohibit the taking of
private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that
power,"' with that condition being "compensation in the event of
otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking." 4 10 The issue ofhow
to determine compensation might now in fact be under discussion in
California, among any officials, politicians, union representatives and
others who might want union organizers access to agricultural property to
continue.
Property owners seeking to bring a Fifth Amendment takings claim
based on "union" or labor-related trespassing, if such claims are ever
recognized, would bring such a claim in either a federal district court or
the U.S. Federal Court of Claims, which have concurrent jurisdiction.4 11
One important principle is that the property owner does not determine the
amount of compensation, which is instead based on "fair market"
value. 4 12 With regard to "partial takings" like temporary trespasses, the
most common method used to determine "justcompensation" for property
takings, at least when the property owner is prevented from using the
property as they normally do, is the market rental value of the property for
the period of the taking. 4 13 It's far from clear that this would be
appropriate for trespasses by nonemployees or employees to try to
organize employees or protest the employer's treatment of its employees.
For temporary takings, courts usually do not admit evidence of lost
income or profits during the period of a temporary taking, because the
value of the land is the actual issue in the case and the profits from a
business are usually considered too speculative for proper consideration

409.
410.
482 U.S.
411.

See generally Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536-37 (2005).
See id. (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A.,
304, 314, 315 (1987)) (emphasis added).
See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2166 (2019) (holding that Fifth

Amendment takings claims can be heard in federal court); see generally John Martinez,
GOVERNMENT TAKINGS, TEN CRITICAL STEPS IN TAKINGS LITIGATION, WESTLAW, Part I, § 2 (Oct.
2021). Any attempt by a property owner to bring into state court a takings claim based on federallycovered labor law "intrusions" could be readily removed to federal court by a defendant union, union
agent or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (federal removal statute).
412. See generally Mark S. Dennison, Landowner's Evidence of Market Value in Eminent

Domain Proceeding, 60 AM. JUR. TRIALS 447, III.A. §8 (1996, updated Oct. 2021).
413. See id. at Q 8.
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by the trier of fact.4 14 However, a few courts in isolated decisions have
permitted triers of fact to consider lost profits in calculating just
compensation where such losses could be demonstrated with reasonable
certainty, which would likely require expert testimony.4 15 Again, though,
this method has been used when the property owner is temporarily
deprived, completely or substantially, of the ordinary use of their
property. 4 16 As for borrowing the law of trespass damages in determining
"just compensation" for a Fifth Amendment taking, that would depart
from Fifth Amendment law, and would require determining what state's
law should be borrowed. 4 17 However, for any enterprise, whether for
profit or non-profit, it's unlikely any damages could be awarded for
"emotional" harms. 4 18
In sum, any party seeking "just compensation" under the Fifth
Amendment for union or labor law related trespassing would be seeking
the court to enter an uncharted area. 4 19 And any "lost revenue or profits"
would have to be based on the diminution in value of the property, not any
losses the property owner might seek to prove based on customers
persuaded by the union's message. 420 The same uncertain damages issues
will be raised if property owners sue for any government or governmentauthorized intrusions that somehow fail Cedar Point Nursery's
"exceptions" but are also temporary and don't interfere with the property
owner's using the property as it customarily does.4 21
This might not bother the U.S. Supreme Court's members, but it
should trouble any property owner seeking to sue over temporary
trespasses that allegedly violate the principles established by CedarPoint
Nursery. Given the uncertainty, such litigation will likely be expensive
and require expert testimony. 422 Although such claims would have to be

414. Id.
415. See id.; see, e.g., W.H. Pugh Coal Co. v. State of Wis., 460 N.W.2d 787, 791 (Ct. App.
1990).
416. See Dennison, supra note 412, at § 26.
417. See id. at § 8.
418. See Stuart M. Speiser et. al., AM. L. OF TORTS, STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT AND RELATED
REMEDIES; INTENTIONAL TORTS, wESTLAW, §23.37 (Mar. 2021).
419. See Jeffery L. Braun & James G. Greilsheimer, The Supreme Court Further Expands the
Definition of a Physical "Taking" of Property That Violates Fifth Amendment Protections,KRAMER
LEVIN (Jul. 30, 2021) https://www.kramerlevin.com/en/perspectives-search/the-supreme-courtfurther-expands-the-definition-of-a-physical-taking-of-property-that-violates-fifth-amendmentprotections.html.

420.
421.
422.

See id.
See id.
See generally Dennison, supranote 412 at §§ 12, 16-18, 20, 26-27, 33, 35-36, 60, 62 (citing

numerous cases that utilized expert testimony).
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against the federal government for allowing the taking, a property owner
would be well-advised to settle with the non-party union on whose behalf
the "trespass" for organizing or protest has occurred. 423 A settlement
could resolve the property owner's issues and concerns more quickly and
at less cost than suing the U.S. government. 424 If access is important
enough, a union might offer to "pay as it goes" for the trespasses it wants
to commit, and some property owners may accept this offer to avoid the
costs associated with litigation.4 25 A union willing to pay an agreed-upon
amount for access could seem to many property owners a sensible
alternative to expensive and uncertain litigation. 426 Especially if property
owners decline offers for union access and instead continue a Fifth
Amendment takings suit, the union (or government) might seek to admit
into evidence the proof that the union made an offer to pay for access, and
the amount of that offer was. 427 Such evidence would probably be
admissible because trial judges have considerable discretion in deciding
what evidence to admit regarding compensation in a Takings case. 42 8
Thus, it would not be farfetched for judges to order the amount offered by
a union as the amount that has to be paid.
Of course this is all mere speculation as to what could happen if the
Fifth Amendment Takings clause is conclusively determined to be the
source of property rights in federal labor law, given that "compensation"
and not injunctive relief should be the usual remedy when a government

423.

See generally Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth

Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just
compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.").
424. See generally Alan E. Friedman, Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. REV.
67, 88 (1969) (stating that the costs associated with litigation can be expensive, thus parties "should
settle their dispute[s] and avoid unnecessary litigation expenses" if they receive a sufficient settlement

offer).
425. The property owner's claim would be against the federal government agency or agencies
that permitted the union intrusion and the government would have to pay "compensation" to the
property owner. The federal Anti-Deficiency Act bars government agencies from spending funds that
are not appropriated or otherwise authorized by federal statute. Thus, the union could not reimburse
the government because reimbursement would violate the federal Anti-Deficiency Act. See generally
Steven W. Feldman, Fiscal Law Essentials: The Antideficiency Act, in GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
AWARDS: NEGOTIATION AND SEALED BIDDING at § 1.11, WESTLAW (database updated Oct. 2020).
426. See Friedman, supra note 424 at 88 ("Judicial resources are squandered if parties proceed
to formal adjudication in cases where settlement would be more profitable for each.").

427. See, e.g., Nat'l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Goodremote, 13 A.D. 3d 1134, 1134 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2004) (stating that the court admitted evidence of previous offers for an easement).
428. See, e.g., Daniel F. Sullivan, Market Value of Single-Family Residence - Market
Comparison Appraisal, in 5 AM. JUR. 2D Proofof Facts § 411 at § 3, Westlaw (database updated
Nov. 2021); Richard J. Kohlman, Condemnation of Easements, in 22 AM. JUR. 2D § 743 at § 43,
Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2021).
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permits an intrusion. 429 In the future, what really should happen is that
federal courts and agencies recognize that, notwithstanding Cedar Point
Nursery and Justice Kavanagh's concurrence therein, Fifth Amendment
Takings cases under the U.S. Constitution simply do not make sense for
the kinds of trespasses that unions, their agents and employees
historically committed and are likely to commit in the future. 43 0 Unless
federal courts at any level want to open the door to extensive litigation
that will take many years-probably more than a decade-to resolve they
should follow the CedarPointNursery majority and hold that the Takings
clause of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to property access that
involves established federal labor law. 43 1
CONCLUSION

In its 2021 Cedar Point Nursery decision, the "Roberts Court"
continued its re-write of Fifth Amendment's Takings law.432 This article
has maintained that, as the Supreme Court majority avoided doing in
CedarPointNursery, the Court and other federal courts should not also
rewrite federal labor law by holding that property owner rights that, under
that law, are balanced against NLRA Section 7 rights of employees and
union agents, are grounded in and covered by the Takings clause. 4 33 That
would disrupt more than 80 years of Supreme Court precedent that has
been applied and relied on, by millions of employees and their
employers. 4 34 The uncertainty created would be harmful and wholly
unnecessary.
The article also discusses current federal labor law on access to
property and maintains that federal labor law should be interpreted such
that all employees covered by it should have some access to the "property"
where they or their employer performs work.4 35 Finally, this article
429.

See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2176-78 (2019).

430.
431.
432.

See supraPart IV.
See supraPart IV.A.
See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167-68 (in 2019 the Supreme Court overruled its decision in

Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Plan. Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) that
held a property owner claiming a property Taking by a local government could not bring that claim
in federal court until after a state court had denied that Takings claim); see also Horne v. Dep't of

Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ( in Justice
Thomas' concurrence and Justice Breyer's dissent, both Justices state that the legal rules for
determining compensation and for defining regulatory takings that do not require compensation

should be changed).
433. See supra Part II-IV.
434.
435.

See supraPart IV.B.
See supraPart II.
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analyzes why the Fifth Amendment Takings clause should not be applied
to federal labor law but explains why, if it is, the text of that Clause should
be complied with and unions and their "nonemployee" representatives
should only owe "just compensation" for access to property and not be
absolutely excluded from it as they are now. 436

436.

See supra Part III.
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